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ABST R A C T 
 
 
 
The economic integration between natural and managed ecosystem is a growing area of 
interest to agricultural policy makers. The complexity of such integration has many different 
implications for the development of appropriate policy. Often, management of wetland resources 
located on private land involves a perceived conflict between social and private interests since 
landowners usually cannot benefit economically from wetlands on site unless they convert them 
to alternative uses such as agricultural crops. In general it has been shown that the market will 
undersupply public goods and/or oversupply public bads, and that often public organizations 
(e.g. government) have a role to ensure the provision of public goods, such as many categories of 
ecological goods and services (EG&S).  
The development of effective policy to ensure efficient provision of EG&S is hampered by 
a poor understanding of the preferences and values of EG&S held by farmers and society. Thus, 
the present work proposes the investigation of the preferences of society with respect to EG&S 
provision in the province of Saskatchewan.  Using data from a survey of Saskatchewan residents, 
the willingness to pay (WTP) for wetland attributes was quantified. In addition, participant’s 
perceived share of conservation responsibilities were assessed.  As indicated by the results from 
two logit models that were developed based on survey responses, respondents felt that all of the 
wetland management attributes are significant factors in the choice of a wetland management 
scenario, and ceteris paribus, higher levels of any single attribute increases the probability that a 
management scenario is selected.  In other words, respondents prefer those wetland management 
scenarios which result in higher levels of riparian area, wildlife population and water quality. 
Indeed, the results from management scenarios presented in this study suggest that when 
considering wetland preservation in Saskatchewan agricultural areas, participants would most 
likely prefer policies that provide water quality. Overall, this study is expected to inform policy 
makers  of  society’s  preferences  towards EG&S provision  in  Saskatchewan. 
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1. CHAPTER – INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Ecosystem management is an area of study area that has been receiving growing interest. 
Particularly, the complexity of the physical interactions that allows marketed and non-marketed 
goods being jointly produced has been challenging policy makers recently. However, the 
argument that public policy needs to address issues of public goods under-provision is not new. 
There is a long history of research that identifies the need for public provision or public 
intervention through appropriate policy instruments when considering the private or market 
provision of goods and services that have the characteristics of public goods. 
Within economics, the concept that is often used to capture the joint production of market 
or private goods such as agricultural commodities and public goods and services such as 
ecological goods and services (EG&S) is the concept of externality. An externality is understood 
as an impact, positive or negative, on any party not directly involved in the economic decision.  
In other words, an externality exists when an economic activity causes external costs or benefits 
to a third party who cannot directly affect the economic transaction or resource use decisions.  
Therefore, in the present context, from agricultural production of a private good, the degradation 
or provision of EG&S can be considered externalities that are absorbed by society (the third 
party).  For example, the generation of biodiversity from native range used for grazing cattle 
could be considered an external benefit from the private decision of the landowner to maintain 
the parcel of land in native cover.  The presence of externalities in a market based economy 
suggests market failure.  From this, some questions are naturally raised, such as: how can a 
market failure be corrected?  If there is a negative externality, who should bear its cost?  
Similarly, if there are social benefits being produced, should society pay for these? How much 
would society be willing to pay or how much would farmers be willing to accept to adopt 
management practices that influence the generation of those externalities? 
One of the primary economic issues associated with the provision of EG&S is the fact that 
by leaving the market unaffected by policy, many EG&S will tend to be undersupplied from a 
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social welfare perspective thereby resulting in inefficient resource allocation.  In a foundational 
paper on the allocation of resources, Coase (1960) describes the economic efficiency of resource 
allocation or outcome in the presence of externality.  From that work originated the Coase 
theorem which states that when trade in an externality is positive and there are no transaction 
costs, bargaining will lead to an efficient outcome regardless of the initial allocation of property 
rights.  More recently, Baliga and Maskin (2003) argue that an allocation that maximizes the 
benefits to all of society will not come about without government intervention when the 
externality is non-excludable (where a pure public EG&S can be an example). In general it has 
been shown that the market will undersupply public goods and/or oversupply public bads, and 
that often public organizations (e.g. government) are required to ensure the provision of public 
goods, such as many categories of EG&S. 
Intervention by government within agroecosystems can be made in many different ways. 
Broadly, the policy tools available can be categorized according to the degree to which a 
farmer’s  participation  is  voluntary,  to  the  role  of  government,  and  to  the  nature of the land 
management decision targeted (Claassen et al., 2001). In a voluntary program, farmers receive 
incentives to adopt environmentally sound production practices, or disincentives to using 
environmentally damaging management, such as technical assistance, subsidy and tax programs. 
On the other hand, regulations are considered involuntary programs. Claassen et al. (2001) 
highlight that producer participation in environmental programs that have been used in the U.S. 
have mostly been voluntary.  The role of government extends from information provider (e.g. 
education and technical assistance programs) to stabilising standards, monitoring and 
enforcement (e.g. regulatory programs).  The three main categories of policy measures in this 
context are: I) information dissemination tools (e.g. educational and technical assistance 
programs); II) economic incentive tools (e.g. land retirement payment, market-based instruments, 
environmental taxes), and; III) regulation (e.g. environmental law). Information dissemination 
and regulation are beyond the scope of this thesis while economic incentive tools will be covered 
in more detail. 
Economic incentive-based  policies  can  provide  positive  incentives  (such  as  “green-
payment”  to  farmers  and  land  retirement)  designed to encourage the provision of positive 
externalities, or decrease the generation of negative incentives (such as input taxes and cost share 
policies) designed to discourage negative externalities.  According to Claassen et al. (2001), 
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economic incentive instruments allow producers greater flexibility of response than regulatory 
approaches, as follows: 
 “Producers are free to weigh the incentive (subsidy or tax) against the costs they will 
encounter in mak ing land use , management, or conservation practice changes tha t could increase a 
total subsidy payment or decrease a tax bill. Some producers may f ind it advantageous to forgo 
subsidies or pay a tax because the cost of mak ing changes is high. O ther producers may mak e 
large changes in response to the incentive . In this way, incentives can direct agri-environmental 
activity toward producers who can mak e changes (achieve gains) a t the lowest cost. Hence , 
economists f requently hail incentive-based polic ies as ef f ic ient tools for environmental goals. 
Whether they are, in fact, effic ient will depend on the agri-environmental setting and the details of 
the program design”.(Claassen et al. 2001). 
 
One of pioneer incentive-based policy approaches to reduce negative externalities is known 
as Pigouvian taxes.  Named after economist Arthur Pigou, these taxes were mainly used to 
correct  the  negativity  externalities  of  a  market  activity.    Thus,  a  Pigouvian  tax  is,  for  example,  “a 
tax levied upon each unit of pollut ion in an amount just equal to the marginal damage it inf lic ts 
upon society at the eff icient level of output ." (Katz and Rosen, 1991).  Therefore, within the 
economic model the tax would cause an increase in the private cost of using the input that is 
taxed or on releasing the output that is taxed.  Facing this increased cost (cost of production), the 
farmer has an incentive to decrease the quantity of that input or the quantity of the output and 
thereby decrease the costs to society of the particular production activity.  For example, a tax on 
nitrogen fertilizer would increase the costs of using that production input resulting in 
management changes that decrease the quantity of nitrogen fertilizer used and/or adopt 
management that uses nitrogen more efficiently. This can potentially result in smaller nitrogen 
loads in runoff and surface and ground water, which can impose significant environmental cost. 
Another example of incentive-based policy is a payment made to landowners responsible 
for positive externalities production. There are many different ways to provide incentives for 
positive externalities production such as subsidies, payments for land retirement, conservation 
payments and others.  For example, payments provided to landowners to convert erodible land to 
some form of perennial vegetative cover can increase carbon sequestration services of the soil 
and wildlife habitat benefits of the land while also decreasing costs associated with soil erosion 
and nutrient runoff. According to the OECD (2006), subsidies are a very common form of agri-
environmental policy in many jurisdictions.  
One of the concerns with developing effective incentive-based policy is the problem of 
asymmetric information. According to Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort (1997), farmers 
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know better than policy makers about how participation in incentive-based program will affect 
their production plans and profit. Likewise, landholders may know little about government 
priorities, societal preferences and how this information might influence subsequent contracts 
(Stoneham et al., 2003). Thus, the recommendation of a cost-effectiveness policy to provide 
EG&S is often difficult to policy makers. The design of a policy, its efficiency and viability can 
vary significantly from one situation to another (Klemperer, 2002; Claassen et al., 2001). 
Therefore, the success of specific environmental policy does not ensure success in other 
contexts. For example, society may have different preferences, the impact (positive or negative) 
of EG&S on society may vary across space and time, the productivity of the land in terms of 
environmental outputs and/or agricultural commodities will also influence different costs and 
priorities of policy.    
The development of effective policy to ensure efficient provision of EG&S is hampered by 
a poor understanding of the preferences and values of EG&S held by farmers and society. Trying 
to establish a policy to ensure efficient provision of EG&S, the present work proposes the 
investigation of the preferences of society with respect to EG&S provision in the province of 
Saskatchewan1.  If it is assumed that the provision of EG&S will be, at least partly, paid for by 
society through incentive-based policy measures, it is important to understand the preferences of 
society with respect to EG&S.   
 
 
1.1. The Problem 
 
Saskatchewan has the largest area of agricultural land in Canada. Concern over the 
relationship between the production of agricultural commodities and the provision of EG&S 
from these same landscapes has been evident in different aspects of provincial and federal level 
agri-environmental policy in recent years. However, understanding the impact of these policies 
and the preferences of society on EG&S provision is somewhat limited.  
                                                 
1 This study is limited to Saskatchewan due to the provincial government interest on the information necessary to 
develop effective policy to provide EG&S in agricultural landscape.  
5 
From the perspective of the policy maker, designing an efficient EG&S program is 
sometimes difficult. One of the main problems for policy makers is effectively understanding the 
preferences and values that farmers and society apply to those EG&Ss that do not have market 
value (public goods).  From this perspective how much the government allocate resources to 
improving, for example, water quality is considered with relation of how much society values the 
increase in water quality.  The problem here is how to exchange information of needs and 
interests between government, society and farmers in order to efficiently provide EG&S.  
 
 
1.2. Research Objectives 
 
The primary purpose of the present research is to help inform the development of effective 
policy to provide EG&S in the agricultural landscape of Saskatchewan.  More specifically, from 
a Saskatchewan government policy perspective, this project is directed at understanding  society’s 
perspective on EG&S and how important the goods and services provided by agricultural 
landscapes are.  This will help policy makers to understand whether government support of 
EG&S provision is supported by Saskatchewan taxpayers.  The following research objectives 
will be addressed in informing the stated problem: 
 Evaluate the preferences and choices over EG&S from Saskatchewan residents;  
 Estimate the perceived level of environmental responsibility, between society and 
landowners, of providing EG&S on privately owned land; 
 Assess EG&S policy and identify policy implications for Saskatchewan. 
With the proposed objectives, the recommendation of a public policy focused on EG&S 
provision in Saskatchewan is an expected outcome.  
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1.3. Methods and Thesis Organization 
 
As first step toward the development of this project, an assessment of EG&S policy 
measures in Canada and worldwide is provided. This was done primarily through a review of the 
relevant literature. Chapter 2 presents an overview of the status of EG&S functions and 
measurement techniques with a particular focus on wetlands within agricultural landscapes. The 
chapter begins with a brief introduction of EG&S functions, property right problem, public 
policies tools. The chapter concludes by providing an overview of the market and non-market 
valuation mechanisms for valuing wetlands. 
The analytical framework utilized in this research is elaborated in chapter 3. In this chapter 
why a  “market  failure”  may  occur  with  respect  to  wetland  outputs  and  how  it  would  affect 
distribution of land use in privately owned agricultural landscape have been identified. With the 
help of a graphic model, the role of a financial incentive as a policy tool to encourage 
conservation of wetlands is examined as a solution to this problem. 
A choice experiment was then used to determine values and trade-offs, with respect to 
specific categories of EG&S. For the purpose of the present research the EG&S relevant to the 
conservation of wetlands (e.g. water quality, wildlife habitat) was be the primary focus. The 
choice model was addressed using the survey instrument by asking respondents to indicate the 
proportion of the costs of EG&S provision should be provided by the landowner and the 
proportion that should be the responsibility of society through conservation payments. For better 
comprehension, this thesis is structured in the following manner. Chapter 4 contains the 
methodological information and the description of the survey adopted in the study.  
Chapter 5 presents a description of the results for the empirical work for this analysis along 
with a discussion of significant variables. In this chapter it is shown how society perceive the 
level of responsibility for EG&S provided by wetland management and the amount of economic 
incentive society are willing to pay for them. The results have policy implications that are also 
discussed in chapter 5.  
Lastly, chapter 6 summarizes the results of the thesis and offers the limitation of the study. 
Topics for future research are suggested.   
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2. CHAPTER – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
2.1.Introduction   
 
The economic integration between natural and managed ecosystem is a growing area of 
interest to agricultural policy makers (Hodge, 2000). The complexity of such integration has 
many different implications for the development of appropriate policy. Economic theory has 
been challenged by the characterization of Ecological Goods and Services (EG&S), and 
especially, the role that society plays in the provision and consumption of such goods and 
services. When considering the private or market provision of goods and services that have the 
characteristics of public goods (e.g. non-rivalry and non-excludability which will be developed 
later in this discussion) there is a long history of research that identifies the need for public 
provision or public intervention through appropriate policy instruments.   
One of the primary economic issues2 associated with the provision of wetland goods and 
services is the fact that by leaving just to the market, many EG&S will tend to be undersupplied 
from a social welfare perspective thereby resulting in inefficient resource allocation.  In general 
it has been shown that the market will undersupply public goods and/or oversupply public bads, 
and that often public organizations (e.g. government) are required to ensure the provision of 
public goods, such as many categories of EG&S (Hardin, 2009). Intervention by government 
within EG&S management can be made in many different ways (Claassen, et al., 2001).  
Despite some success, the recommendation of a cost-effectiveness wetland management 
policy remains a difficulty to policy makers. The design of a policy, its efficiency and viability 
can vary significantly from one situation to another (Claassen, et al., 2001; Klemperer, 2002). 
Therefore, the success of specific environmental policy does not ensure success in other context. 
                                                 
2 As discussed on the introductory chapter, an example of seminal work of process that leads into market failure and 
the need of institutional interference, see  Coase (1960). 
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For example, society may have different preferences, the impact (positive or negative) of EG&S 
on society may vary across space and time, the productivity of the land in terms of 
environmental outputs and/or agricultural commodities will also influence different costs and 
priorities of policy. Thus, this chapter presents the background and issues relevant to the research 
objectives of this study. It is a general discussion of previous studies, literature, and types of 
programs and policies specific to the research problem. 
 
 
2.2.Ecological Good & Services General Considerations 
 
Economic theory classifies goods and services, and the capacity of those goods and 
services to be provided by markets, according to whether they exhibit the characteristics of 
rivalry and excludability (Romer, 1990, 1994). Excludability refers to the characteristic where 
individuals can be excluded from using or consuming the good which enables the producer to 
charge a fee to those who want to consume.  For example, a farmer produces agricultural 
commodities (e.g. grain) with the knowledge that they can sell the commodity to a consumer, in 
exchange for a price, all other potential consumers can be excluded from using that commodity.  
Rivalry refers to the characteristic of goods and services where the use by one consumer is 
precluded by someone else or worded in another way, the use of a good or service by an 
individual makes less of the good or service available for other users. The combination of these 
two characteristics results in four types of goods: private good (rival and excludable); toll good 
(non-rival and excludable); common-pool good (rival and non-excludable), and; public good 
(non-rival and non-excludable). Within this classification among private good are crop products, 
livestock, and food in general; a very common example of toll good is the uncongested toll 
highway, where the addition of one car would not affect the traffic as a whole, and all drivers 
have to pay some toll; ocean fish, water, and hunting game can be examples of common-pool 
goods – in all these examples we consider a situation where there is no way to exclude others 
from consuming/doing the activity, but each one behaviour affect all – so if someone decides to 
harvest more fish, there will be less fish left to others. Finally, public goods can be clean air, 
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beautiful landscape, rivers, and quiet – all these examples cannot be assessed a toll for its use 
(there is no charge for those that want see a beautiful sunset on a landscape), and the number of 
people looking at the view does not affect others. Nevertheless, before classifying EG&S 
according to economic  theory,  it’s  important  to  understand  more  precisely  what  is  meant  by 
ecosystem functions and EG&S. 
The demand for EG&S valuation to help inform development and policy decisions has 
experienced a significant increase in the past 10 to 15 years with a corresponding increase in 
research focused on the issue (Pearce, 1993; Turner, 1993; De Groot, 1992, 1994; Bingham et 
al., 1995; Daily 1997; Costanza et al., 1997; Pimentel & Wilson, 1997; Limburg & Folke, 1999; 
Wilson & Carpenter, 1999; Daily et al., 2000; De Groot et al., 2002). However, there is no exact 
boundary around the definition of EG&S and ecosystem functions which has caused some recent 
problems (De Groot et al., 2002; Vikhlyaev, 2004; Claro et al., 2007).  EG&S have been 
mentioned in some of the most important international policy meetings around the world and it is 
a concept that is often still being interpreted differently from country to country (Claro et al, 
2007). Such a situation indicates a necessity of being clear about the definition to be adopted by 
policy makers.   
A definition for EG&S was proposed by De Groot (1992), which considers ecosystem 
functions  as  “the  capacity  of  natural  process  to  provide  goods  and  services  that  satisfy  human 
needs,  directly  or  indirectly”.  According  to  this definition, ecosystem functions are best 
conceived as a sub-set of ecological processes and ecosystem structure.  Each function is the 
result of natural process of the total ecological sub-system of which it is a part.  A natural 
process, in turn, is the result of complex interactions between biotic and abiotic components of 
ecosystem through the universal driving forces of matter and energy.  
Expanding this concept, De Groot et al. (2002) proposes a typology for the classification of 
ecosystem functions, goods and services.  These authors suggest four groups of ecosystem 
functions (regulations, habitat, production and information) which, in turn, provide goods and 
services that are valued by humans. On the other hand, this classification limits the concept of 
goods and services to those that can be used on a sustainable3 basis, in order to maintain the 
                                                 
3 Those authors use the definition of sustainable proposed by De Groot et a l . (2000): “the natural limits set by the 
carrying capacity of the natural environment (physically, chemically and biologically), so that human use does not 
irreversibly  impair  the integrity and proper functioning of its natural processes and components”. 
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ecosystem functions and associated ecosystem processes and structures.  This restriction 
excludes some natural mineral resources (gold, iron, diamonds and oil) and some energy sources 
(e.g. wind and solar-energy), and include some non-ecosystem specific functions (e.g. use of 
natural waterway for transportation) and some mineral sources that are removable within a time-
frame of 100-1000 years (e.g. sand on beaches provided by dead coral and shells).  In 
conclusion, De Groot et al. (2002)  states  that  it’s  possible  to  arrive  at  a  monetary  estimation  of 
human preferences for the availability and maintenance of the related ecosystem services.  
However, there is still a problem with his model which leads to the possibility of economically 
double-counting.  To illustrate the overlapping problem, consider: gas-regulation functions (and 
associated services) have an influence on climate and can therefore be evaluated separately, or as 
an integral part of the climate regulation service (De Groot et al., 2002). Therefore, the problem 
of overlapping resides in the interconnectedness of certain ecological functions. 
For the propose of this thesis, the EG&S concept will rest on the Canadian definition4 
which  consider  EG&S  as  “goods  and  services  that  are  used,  or  can  potentially  be  used,  to 
measure, prevent, limit or correct environmental damage (both natural or by human activity) to 
water, air, soil as well as problems related to  waste,  noise  and  ecosystem”  (Statistics  Canada, 
2007). According to this definition, clean or resource-efficient  (“eco-efficient”)  technologies  that 
decrease material inputs, reduce energy consumption, recover valuable by-products, reduce 
emissions and/or minimize waste disposal problems are included within the definition for EG&S.  
This Canadian definition suggests a broader concept than the international one proposed by 
OECD/Eurostat.    The  main  difference  between  them  are  in  “or  can  potentially  be  used”  and  in 
the  specification  damage  causes  “both  natural  or  by  human  activity”.  Statistic  Canada  (2007) 
highlights that the focus of the Canadian definition is on the end-use instead of the physical 
attributes of goods and services.  This definition also address  the  question:  “Does  a  particular 
good or service exist in the market either solely or partly because of its environmental 
components?”. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Unless it is clearly specified the opposite (e.g. EG&S by international/De Groot et al. definition).  
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2.3. EG&Ss provided  by Wetlands   
 
A wide range of EG&S can be produced by an agricultural landscape. Depending on land 
management practices, landowners have the ability to increase, hold steady, or decrease the level 
of EG&S production. Examples of EG&S that can be provided by agriculture include ground 
water recharge, flood and erosion control, carbon sequestration, biodiversity, and air and water 
purification. However, land use practices, in Canada, have served mainly for purpose of 
provisional services (i.e. food production), usually at the expense of environmental protection 
(Olewiler, 2004). Especially for Saskatchewan where EG&S provided by wetlands have been 
historically under-supplied in agricultural landscape.   
Cortus (2005), for example, determined the economic feasibility of draining wetlands on 
farms in eastern Saskatchewan. From this study, it was found that a rational farm operator would 
drain wetland areas, rather than purchase new lands to expand his cultivated land base. The cost 
of purchasing land in the study area averaged around $640 per hectare, while the cost of draining 
wetlands was approximately $500 per hectare (Cortus, 2005). Thus, conducting drainage on 
existing lands was profitable to the farm operator. Wetland areas do not provide direct financial 
benefits to crop producers, so the incentive to convert wetlands can be considerable. 
Furthermore, Cortus (2005) argue that there may be a direct nuisance cost associate with 
maintaining wetlands, which make up approximately 35% of the benefits achieved from draining 
wetlands. More recently, studying the economics of wetland drainage and retention in 
Saskatchewan, Cortus et al. (2011) compared the private net benefits to existing estimates of the 
public benefits to retaining wetlands, and concluded that wetlands were still at risk of damage.  
 
2.3.1. Wetland  Ecological Functions   
As discussed above EG&S represent the benefits that humans derive from ecosystem 
functions (Prairie Habitat Joint Venture, 2005; Costanza, et al., 1997; Costanza, et al., 1998). 
Wetlands fulfil a diverse number of functions that result from the interaction between the 
structural component (soil, flora, and fauna) and the physical, chemical, and biological processes 
(Seyam et al., 2001). Many wetland functions are interdependent because one single process 
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influences more than one function. This basic understanding implies that the continuity of a 
single function is not separable from other functions; it depends on the maintenance of the 
integrity of the entire system (de Groot, 1992; Seyam et al., 2001). Thus, a natural concern is 
how to decompose ecological systems into commodities that are both consistent with ecological 
science and meaningful to society (Carson & Mitchell, 1993). 
Analogous to the standard production system, wetland attributes can also be thought as 
production functions transforming biophysical inputs into ecological endpoints (Boyd & 
Krupnick, 2009). Biophysical inputs are environmental features or conditions that are converted 
via natural processes into different environmental features or condition (Boyd & Krupnick, 
2009). Ecological endpoints, however, are a subset of biophysical outputs that directly enter firm 
or home production, which require little or no subsequence biophysical translation in order to 
make the relevance to utility clear. Thus, ecological endpoints are things people experience, 
make choice about, and that have tangible meaning. For example, the dissolved oxygen level in 
water is not directly experienced, nor is it typically the subject of household choice, nor is it 
tangibly meaningful to most non-experts. But there are ecological endpoints that are dependent 
on dissolved oxygen as an input. Dissolved oxygen can affect fish populations and water clarity 
and odour, for example. These attributes are much more likely to be directly experienced, bear 
directly on households choices, or be identified as intuitively important to utility. Therefore, it 
can be described as ecological endpoints to a system involving dissolved oxygen (an input to the 
endpoints’  production)  (Boyd  &  Krupnick,  2009).  Carson  and  Mitchell  (1993)  provide  an 
example of the distinction between inputs and endpoints by translating numerical water quality 
measures that lack meaning to non-experts into non-technical  categories  such  as  “swimable”, 
“fishable”  and  “boatable”.  Similarly,  Bateman  et  al.  (2005)  convey  the  biological  impacts and 
risks associated with increasing levels of acidity in a manner that can be linked to, but do not 
require presentation of pH levels, since pH levels are not meaningful to non-experts. There are 
many types of EG&S, which as presented by Swinton (2008), encompass four broad areas 
according to the services they provide, as determined by Milleniun Ecological Assessment 
(2005): 
- “Provisioning  services:  include  food,  fibre, wood, fuel and fresh water that provide for 
human subsistence; 
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- Regulating services: maintain the balance  of  Earth’s  systems  at  levels  that  enables 
human survival. These services include climate, flood, water quality and disease 
regulation. Examples include vegetation that buffers the effect of natural flooding, or 
predator – prey systems that limit the spread of pathogens; 
- Cultural services: include the spiritual, inspirational, aesthetic, heritage, recreational 
and tourism benefits; 
- Supporting services: include the myriad natural systems that enable the three tiers 
above. For example, organic matter cycling contributes to soil creation, which makes 
food provision possible. Photosystensis transforms solar energy into plant matter, 
enabling  provisioning  services,  carbon cycling,  and various  other services.”   
The types of EG&S that humans receive from wetlands or wildlife habitat are numerous 
and fall across each of the above categories. From these categories, many EG&S have been used 
especially in valuation studies, recently. However, the EG&S characterization for valuation 
studies has been the focus of some concerns. The section below introduces the EG&S 
characterization in valuation studies, which supports a more detailed discussion later in this 
chapter. 
 
 
2.4. Market Failure and Wetland  Valuation   
 
2.4.1. Wetland  valuation  studies 
For valuing wetlands, different frameworks are described in the literature. Roggeri (1995, 
cited by Seyam, et al., 2001) for example distinguishes wetland resources, wetland attributes and 
physical/hydrological functions. However, none of the distinguished categories is exclusive and 
no one benefit is exclusive to one category (Seyam et al., 2001). Whitten and Bennett (2005) 
argue that the attributes would be defined to describe the outcomes of alternative wetland 
management strategies. Bennett and Adamowicz (2001) further state that attributes must be 
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measurable, of significance to policy makers and easily communicable to the wider community 
in the survey format. An example of easily communicable characterization can be the ecological 
system approach which will be described in the next paragraph. 
According to Boyd and Krupnick (2009), there are several advantages to the ecological 
system approach. First, subjects are not required to understand the ecological system in order for 
the analyst to achieve a comprehensive valuation of the wetland  bundle.  It  doesn’t  matter  if  a 
subject  knows  nothing  about  wetlands  and  their  relationship  to  water  quality,  since  they  aren’t 
being asked to value that relationship. Instead, they are being asked to directly value water 
quality. Second, the interpretation of valuations no longer hinges on the information assumptions 
associated  with  the  subjects.  Third,  estimation  of  the  production  functions’  role  in  generating 
value is left to those who can make the estimation most accurately: experts, instead of less 
informed subjects. Finally, endpoints can be recomposed into endpoint bundles in order to 
clearly detect substitution and complementarities effects across the endpoints (Boyd & Krupnick, 
2009). 
However, EG&S are often provided by complex ecological process resulting in dual 
commodities, where some components of the ecological output can be input to other ecological 
process.  For  example,  riparian  area  considered  as  wildlife  habitat  isn’t  necessarily an endpoint, 
since it can be an input to many ecological processes. However, it can be considered endpoint if 
described as, for example, “land cover that is natural open space and thus a contribut ion to 
aesthet ic, bequest , or recreat ional benef its”  (Boyd  &  Krupnick,  2009).  Indeed,  attributes 
encountered in environmental valuation problems may be highly correlated and not intrinsically 
separable (Holmes & Adamowicz, 2003). Furthermore, if two correlated attributes were treated 
as independent in a valuation experiment, respondents might become confused, reject the 
scenario, and fail to answer the question. Although some empirical studies indicate that treating 
correlated attributes as independent factors does not cause serious problems (Huber & McCann, 
1982; Moore & Holbrook, 1990; cited by Holmes & Adamowicz, 2003), in general, this problem 
is best solved by selecting attributes that represent separable dimensions of the valuation 
problem (Holmes & Adamowicz, 2003). There is a wide range of EG&S characterization in the 
resource economics literature. For example, in a meta-analysis of wetland valuation studies, 
Brander et al. (2006) collected 215 value observations in 190 wetland valuation studies, which 
range from recreational fishing to climate stabilization or appreciation of uniqueness to 
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culture/heritage. The figure below presents some examples of commonly used EG&S in 
valuation studies. The x axis represent the frequency in which each of the EG&S is observed in 
different studies according to Brander et al. (2006). 
 
F igure  2.1. Numbe r of obse rvations  for e ach we tland goods  and se rvices . 
Source: adapted from Brander et a l . (2006).  
 
Among the wide range of EG&S provided by wetland, three of them are detailed below.  
- Riparian area: those areas located immediately beside wetlands, streams and rivers. 
The riparian area can be measured according to the closest distance from the water 
surface to the agricultural land. Under the endpoint definition, riparian area (as 
explained earlier) can be considered a dual commodity (Boyd & Krupnick, 2009). 
However, many wetland valuation studies have considered riparian area as an attribute 
(see Do & Bennett, 2007; Carlsson, Frykblom & Liljenstolpe, 2003; Whitten & 
Bennett, 2005).  
- Wildlife population: described as the abundance of wildlife species present in wetland, 
wildlife population can be considered an endpoint commodity (Boyd & Krupnick, 
2009). The abundance of wildlife, such as fishes and ducks have also been identified 
as attributes in wetland valuation studies (Carlsson, Frykblom & Liljenstolpe, 2003; 
Whitten & Bennett, 2005; respectively). Wildlife population have also been 
considered in more general terms within biodiversity abundance by Birol et al., 
(2006).  
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- Water quality: can be considered a dual commodity; however, it is an endpoint if 
described in such way that has direct relevance to households (Boyd & Krupnick, 
2009). For example, the Boil Water Advisory, which is a public warning stating that 
the water supplied by a specific location may be unsafe for consumption. This means 
that prior to drinking, cooking, or even brushing your teeth, the water must be brought 
to a rolling boil for a specified amount of time. 
As the examples demonstrate, attributes can be defined so that it is measurable and easily 
communicable. Furthermore, by representing separable dimensions (e.g. water quality and 
wildlife population) of the valuation problem, attributes can describe the outcomes of alternative 
wetland management strategies that are of significance to policy makers. 
2.4.1.1. Water quality  Rationality  for Saskatchewanians 
Water quality has long been a concern to Saskatchewan residents. According to the 
Saskatchewan Watershed Authority (SWA, 2010a), surface and ground water sources are vital 
for this province and a key driver for economic activities. Among the examples of services that 
water provides to Saskatchewan society, are: water supply for people, irrigation, livestock, and 
industry; maintenance of healthy environment; fish and wildlife habitat; hydropower generation; 
and recreational opportunities. However, as discussed earlier, the economically rational reaction 
for landowners is to drain their wetland and use the land for agricultural purposes (Cortus, 2005). 
In fact, many watersheds have been lost in Saskatchewan in the past. More recently, SWA 
(2010a) released a report informing that the majority of watersheds in agricultural Saskatchewan 
are at least under moderate intensity stress (66% of the total provincial watersheds).  
 In an attempt to address this situation and guarantee sustainable water supply for 
Saskatchewan society, provincial government through SWA is developing a $7.5 million multi-
year project to ensure water supply information is available and understood to meet the economic 
needs of the province (SWA, 2010b). The provision of clean water is an issue of worldwide 
importance and the role of wetlands in providing water quality is increasingly recognized by 
society and policy makers in Saskatchewan. Thus, attributes measurements for goods and 
services related to water quantity and/or quality is expected to be relevant for both policy makers 
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and society in Saskatchewan (section 4.3.1 provide more detail about the water quality attribute 
used in this study).  
 
2.4.2. Economic  Valuation 
From the policy maker perspective, designing an efficient EG&S program is sometimes 
difficult. One of the main problems for policy makers is understanding the preferences and 
values that farmers and society apply to those EG&S that do not have market value (public 
goods). Theoretically, in the context of the present discussion, this is a process to assign dollar 
values to goods and services provided by wetlands. In classical economics, the dollar value of a 
good is determined through the open market decided by the interaction of consumers demand 
and producers supply for the good. But this is not always possible for ecosystem goods and 
services since many such goods and services are complex and multifunctional (Barbier et al. 
1997). The danger, if the 'unpriced' value is not included in development decisions, is policy 
makers can not quantify the consequence of decisions and hence the final outcome of the policy 
will be biased in favour of those uses which have commercial value and many environmental 
resources cannot be properly conserved. Therefore, from agricultural production of a private 
good, EG&S degraded or generated can be external costs or benefits which is absorbed by 
society (the third party). The prevalence of externalities in a market based economy suggests the 
presence of market failure. Thus, in the present context, if a wetland is converted without proper 
valuation, the result can be a significant economic loss to society. Losses may include essential 
environmental functions as well as the biological values the wetland provides.   
Olewiler (2004) argues that due to the loss of its natural areas, Canada is currently facing a 
crisis. According to Adamowicz (2007), such crisis has a negative impact on Canadian well-
being, especially due to the depreciation of habitat, EG&Ss related to air, water quality and 
endangered species loss. But, Canadian governments are becoming increasingly aware of the 
need to protect natural capital. Olewiler (2007) lists five possible sources of problems to natural 
capital: i) lack of knowledge about our stocks and flows of natural capital and how much of it we 
need to protect; ii) the failure of markets to price nonmarket EGS; iii) competing priorities of 
governments; iv) financial constraints; v) insufficient long term planning by public decision-
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makers. Therefore, increasing the understanding of societal preferences for EG&S can be used to 
help direct policies. Economic valuation for environmental resources such as wetlands play an 
important  role  when  prevailing  market  valuation  mechanisms  don’t  effectively  represent  their 
environmental benefits. With the help of economic valuation, the competing uses of 
environmental resource can be effectively compared based on the trade-offs of resource 
allocation options to provide decision makers information that can directly inform conservation 
policies and increase the efficiency of resources management. 
 
 
2.5. Level of responsibility  for managing  wetland 
 
Following the debate of the importance of EG&S provision, and the development of policy 
measures to establish incentives for this provision, the question of who should be responsible for 
managing those resources, (or who should bear their costs) naturally arises. Examples of EG&S 
provided by prairie wetlands include groundwater recharge, flood and erosion control, carbon 
sequestration, biodiversity, and air and water purification. These EG&Ss represent benefits to 
people even if there is no consumptive monetary value for it. Whether it is the clean air they 
breathe, the clean water they drink, or the sight-seeing of wildlife they enjoy, people attach value 
to protecting and enhancing EG&S. For this reason, if property rights could easily be 
distinguished  for  an  individual’s  clean  air,  the  price  he  or  she  would  be  willing  to  pay  would 
likely be substantial (Dollevoet, 2010). To reiterate and expand upon existing wetland policies, 
in Saskatchewan where wetland numbers are at a critical level to provide important ecological 
goods and services and are particularly vulnerable to climate change, policies must address the 
need for continued wetland protection (Johnson, et al., 2005). Wetland policy will require an 
array of tools to meet social objectives; perhaps the most important consideration in choosing 
policy tools is how the costs will be distributed between farmers and society.  
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2.5.1. Property  rights  for wetland  policy development 
Property rights represent “one individual’s ability, in expected terms, to consume the goods 
or the services direct ly or to consume it indirect ly through exchange”  (Barzel,  1997;  cited by 
Whitten, 2003). That is, the stronger the property rights, the larger the proportion of the benefit 
stream the individual can access and potentially trade (Whitten, 2003). According to Kaplowitz 
(2000), when property rights are not well defined, conflict over the management of the 
environmental resources may occur. Generally, the conflicting parts have two distinct views. 
First, private landowners may claim that they hold the right to do as they wish with the resources 
on their land, which may result in Environmental degradation due to higher economic returns 
(e.g. crop production gains due to wetland drainage). Second, the public has a right to public 
environmental amenities derived from resources on private land and management decisions 
should be made in the context of socially acceptable behaviours.   
The problem of these conflicting interests is exacerbated by the lack of properly defining 
the property rights. Benidickson (2002) argues that, in Canada, property rights aren’t  clearly 
protected by the Charter of Rights and F reedoms, or any constitutional provisions (despite 
existing implicitly). The problem generated by the lack of precise definition makes regulation of 
wetland management in a statutory framework very difficult. Therefore, the information 
provided by well-defined property rights can help design wetland policies.  
 
 
2.6.Approaches  to sustainable wetland  policy development 
 
Claassen et al. (2001) highlight that good sustainable policies are those that target funding 
to the areas where benefits are greatest relative to costs, allow producers the flexibility to meet 
environmental objectives and involve program co-ordination to avoid duplication and to offset 
the costs of each other. In the past, agri-environmental policies focused on pollution prevention; 
this focus gradually shifted to broaden the definition of environmental protection to ecosystem 
and landscape protection to ensure the provision of all ecological goods and services as opposed 
to targeting a single benefit (Claassen et al. 2001). While conceptually the ecosystem approach 
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has taken hold in society and with policy makers there is yet to be legislation passed that truly 
reflects the ecosystem approach (Cuddington, 2008). A variety of policy tools can be used to 
meet wetland conservation objectives ranging from voluntary to mandatory (Claassen, et al., 
2001). The following section will provide details of the more common policy tools used to 
address environmental objectives. 
 
2.6.1. Regulation    
Regulation is a policy mechanism in which the participation option is involuntary. Rather 
than creating mechanisms to facilitate or encourage improvements in environmental 
performance, policy makers can simply require it. Policy makers can implement environmental 
regulation through a combination of statutory law, tort law and contractual law. Often, the 
provisions in these statutes for environmental protection are focused on environmental pollution, 
usually  incorporating  the  “polluter  pays”  principle (Claassen, et al., 2001). For example, the ban 
on production and application of the chemical DDT is a regulation warranted when  society’s 
acceptable level of tolerance for environmental degradation is low. In fact, examples of 
regulation are often present in public health and safety concerns, in highly environmentally 
sensitive areas and where changes are irreversible in a short period of time as in the case of 
species extinction (Claassen, et al., 2001).  
In regulatory policies, government agencies are usually responsible for establishing 
standards, monitoring and enforcing completion. Monitoring and enforcing standards can be 
difficult, particularly in agricultural landscapes where private land ownership dominates, and the 
number of landowners are usually high (Claassen, et al., 2001). For example, Saskatchewan has 
approximately 44,330 farms in an area of 26.02 million hectares (64.3 million acres) 
(Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture, 2006). Thus, monitoring and enforcing landowners 
across this area can be costly, especially if the policy mechanism requires landowners to be 
visited periodically. The difficulties of monitoring and enforcing agricultural landscapes where 
private land ownership dominates can also be verified for the Brazilian Forestall Code, which 
establishes that all water shed, river or lake within a farms must have at least 30 meters of 
riparian area, and each farm must allocate at least 20% of the total area for forest conservation 
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(called nature reserve). Such regulatory policy, for an extremely big area, can be so costly that 
monitoring and enforcing each property becomes nearly impossible, which is forcing the 
Brazilian government to review their Forestall Code5. Indeed, this type of program does not 
allow farmers the flexibility or freedom to opt out if management changes are too costly. 
Regulation is not only costly for taxpayers as the cost of establishing government standards, and 
then monitoring and enforcing them, but also for individuals forced to comply. Especially in the 
prairie agricultural region of Saskatchewan, where the vast majority of wetlands occur on private 
farm lands, a strictly regulatory approach to wetland protection would be unenforceable.  
 
2.6.2. Land retirement  and  investment 
Land retirement and (set aside) is a policy mechanism in which government agencies often 
purchase land for retirement. As one may suggest, this practise is feasible in some cases, but it 
also can be very costly for tracts of land. In fact, when agencies buy a crop land for retiring 
purposes the payments must cover the full value of the land in crop production (rather than the 
costs of modifying practices).  Claassen, et al. (2001) argue that, in addition to the high cost of 
buying land, there may be resentment towards the government for competing against farmers in 
the market for land that is perceived to be suitable for agricultural production. Furthermore, this 
mechanism may not address environmental damages from the vast majority of croplands that 
remains in production. However, land retirement (e.g. wetland restoration) can provide habitat 
that increases wildlife populations, enhancing wildlife viewing, fishing, and hunting. 
Participation is this mechanism is voluntary, which gives more flexibility.  
Land retirement programs are particularly well suited for securing environmental benefits 
that increase with the length of time land is removed from crop production. For example, wildlife 
habitat in wetland areas might have the ecosystem fully established after years of land 
retirement. Retirement programs may also be suitable for areas that are not sustainably farmed, 
such as steep slopes in valleys (Claassen, et al., 2001).  
Often, a conservation easement represents a legal agreement between a landowner and a 
qualified conservation agency that tend to runs for long periods. For Saskatchewan, Ducks 
                                                 
5 In the time that this stud y was written, the Brazilian Forestall Code was under revision.  
22 
Unlimited Canada, Nature Conservancy of Canada and Nature Saskatchewan are some of the 
agencies that are able to hold conservation easements (Government of Saskatchewan, 2011). 
Land owners may also opt for a perpetual easement in which case the natural values of the 
property would remain protected indefinitely, independently if the land is sold in the future (the 
easement would be transferred with the property).  In Canada, the donation of a conservation 
easement may also be viewed as charitable gift by Canada Revenue Agency. The value of the 
gift is the appraised difference between the land's value with the conservation easement and the 
best land-use value without the easement. This taxable benefit may be observed at the time of 
donation or extended over five years (Government of Saskatchewan, 2011). 
 
2.6.3. Economic  incentives for wetland  sustainable development 
Economics incentives for sustainable development are policy mechanisms that enable or 
motivate improvement in behaviour. Participation in this mechanism is voluntary, which brings 
flexibility, since they allow farmers to weigh the costs and the benefits before they choose to 
participate in the program, and with lower costs of monitoring and enforcing. In fact, many 
economic incentives programs are designed to have a virtually zero costs of monitoring and 
enforcements. For example, the Australian Bush Tender requires that farmers show (prove) their 
actions with pictures in order to receive the payment, nevertheless; a non-noticed visit can 
happen (DSE, 2008). Despite the advantages, the efficiency of the program is greatly influenced 
by the program design and the payment mechanism and amount. Claassen, et al. (2001) suggest 
that an effective conservation program may be a combination of economic incentive instruments. 
Thus, no single policy instrument will be effective on its own. In terms of wetland policy in 
Saskatchewan perhaps a combination of compliance and economic incentive programs will be 
the best way of establishing  farmers’  obligations  and rights.  
While incentive instruments represent useful tools to increase ecosystem goods and service 
provision on private land, it is difficult to estimate efficient monetary values for economic 
incentive-based policies. Section 2.7 explores some of the economic tools for estimating 
monetary values for EG&S.  
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2.7.Economic  valuation  for wetland   
 
Economic valuation can be perceived as an attempt to assign quantitative values to goods 
and services provided by environmental resources, whether or not market prices are available to 
assist. According to Barbier et al. (1997),  economic  valuation  is  one  element  “in the effort to 
improve management of environmental resources such as wet land”.  Therefore,  assigning 
quantitative values may help wetland management. More specifically, the objective of valuation 
in assisting wetland management decisions is generally to indicate the overall economic 
efficiency of the various competing uses of wetland resources (Barbier, Acreman, & Knowler, 
1997). There are many mechanisms for valuing EG&Ss, which can be grouped according to 
whether there is a market mechanism to assist the valuation method. Some of the commonly used 
valuation techniques are presented in the next sections. 
 
2.7.1. Market mechanism 
Many ecological goods and services have an established possibility of being traded. 
Among the examples of market mechanisms for ecological goods and services, are wetland 
mitigation banking; fee hunting; carbon market. However, often the presence of a market 
mechanism does not ensure proper provision or conservation of EG&Ss (Pagiola, Landell-Mills, 
& Bishop, 2002). Some of the strengths and weakness of market-based EG&Ss are presented on 
the examples below. 
2.7.1.1.Wetland  mitigation  banking 
Wetland mitigation banking is a market mechanism that reveals values of wetlands through 
market exchanges. The creation of compensatory mitigation banking was established in United 
States in 1990, when the Department of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 
which  recommended  that  U.S.  policy  strive  for  no  net  loss  of  the  nation’s  wetlands. The MOA 
states that “mit igat ion bank ing may be an acceptable form of compensatory mit igat ion”, in which 
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a wetland or stream restoration, creation, enhancement, or preservation project is undertaken 
expressly to provide compensatory mitigation in advance of authorized impacts (Wilkinson & 
Thompson, 2006). The institutional structure established to enable this market exchange 
specifies that when an individual (the permittee) applies for a permit for a project that will 
impact wetlands or waters of the United States, a Corps regulatory official assesses the wetland 
functions that will be lost and determines what mitigation is required: normally the permittee is 
required to do the mitigation themselves, but under some circumstances, the Corps allow them to 
purchase mitigation banking credits, or make a payment in-lieu of mitigation.  These are often 
attractive substitutes to permittees since it relieves them of the time, risk, and financial liability 
of undertaking the mitigation themselves.  However, even when given this choice, some 
permittees may choose to do the mitigation themselves if they have an ideal site for mitigation 
(Kubert, 2007).  
In US, the average amount of compensatory mitigation required by the Corps averaged 
about 19,020 hectares (47,000 acres) per year between 1999 and 2003 (Kubert, 2007).  However, 
during this time the number of mitigation banks has almost doubled, suggesting that Corps 
regulators are increasingly shifting away from requiring permittee-responsible mitigation and 
instead allowing mitigation banking to fulfill compensatory mitigation requirements for 
permittees (Martin, Brumbaugh, & Scodari, 2006). When a permittee is authorized to provide 
compensatory mitigation through use of a commercial mitigation bank or in-lieu fee program, the 
cost to the permittee is the credit price (fee rate) charged for the amount of credits deemed 
necessary by the District Engineer (Martin, Brumbaugh, & Scodari, 2006). There is a 
considerable variation in wetland credit prices within and across the United States. The table 
below presents some of the wetland credit prices charged by commercial mitigation bank and In-
Lieu fee program. 
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Table  2.1. We tland c redit prices charged by comme rc ial mitigation bank and In-L ieu fe e  program 
Corps Division Wetland Credit Prices 
Charged by Commercial 
Mitigation Banks 
Wetland Credit Prices 
Charged by In-Lieu Fee 
Programs 
Lakes and Rivers $7,000- $145,000 $12,000 
Mississippi Valley  $1,500- $100,000 $18,000 
North Atlantic $16,000- $350,000 $16,000- $350,000 
Northwestern $40,000- $120,000 $30,000 
Pacific Ocean   $500-$30,000 
South Atlantic $4,000- $65,000 $12,000- $122,000 
South Pacific $400,000 $125,000 
Southwestern  $2,200- $25,000 $3,000- $30,000 
Source: Martin, Brumbaugh, & Scodari, (2006) 
 
Notwithstanding, the US wetland mitigation banking experience proved to produce 
heterogeneous results. According to BenDor et al. (2009), this program provides mitigation in 
different ways for different types of permittees and at great distances from the original impacts. 
Such issues may be among causes for wetland mitigation banking not being commonly practiced 
by any jurisdiction in Canada (Rubec & Hanson, 2009).   
2.7.1.2.Fee hunting 
Another example of a market mechanism for ecological goods and services, fee hunting is 
the monetary amount landowners charge for hunting access to their property as enabled by the 
appropriate property rights (Jordan & Workman, 1989). For example, if hunters want to enter in 
a farm for hunting purposes, a licence should (at least verbally) receive permission from the 
landowner, who has the right to deny, accept with no charge, or accept under payment condition 
the access to the land they own. According to the United Sates government, while wildlife 
residing on the land is a public good, the right to hunt on private lands is a private good 
controlled by landowners, one that can be sold to hunters willing to pay a fee (Ribaudo et al., 
2008). Fee hunting has been viewed as one means of resolving conflicts over hunter access to 
private land and wildlife requirements for private land habitat. It is also argued that fee hunting 
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gives the landowner an incentive to use agricultural practices that maintain or enhance wildlife 
habitat, to actively coordinate with state wildlife management agencies to manage wildlife to 
their mutual benefit, and to keep their land open to hunters and provide a variety of hunting 
opportunities (Jordan & Workman, 1989). 
Hunting is a popular recreation activity in the United States. Private lands are an important 
source of  hunting  opportunities.  The  U.S.  Fish  and  Wildlife  Services’  2001  Fishing,  Hunting, 
and Wildlife Associated Recreation survey (FHWAR2001) found that almost 75 percent of 
hunting days occurred on private land, 57 percent of all hunters hunted only on private lands, and 
nearly two-thirds hunted at least part of the time on private land. However, while 77 percent of 
farmers allowed hunting, only 5 percent charged a fee according to a 1993 national survey 
(Conover, 1998). The average gross revenue from fee-based recreation activities ranged between 
$13,000 and $18,000 per farm offering these activities between 2000 and 2005 (Ribaudo et al., 
2008). These numbers may be important information to policy makers since it helps to 
understand the demand for wildlife as a component of the EG&S provided by agricultural land. 
Part of the revenues generated by fee hinting can also be reverted to habitat conservation 
(Ribaudo et al., 2008).   
 
2.7.2. Non­market  valuation  method 
Although market measures can help EG&S provision many goods and services have no 
standard market information. In fact, many aspects of natural resources, and in particular EG&S, 
fit into this category (Kanninen, 2006). For example, under current institutions one may not be 
able to buy or sell a deer, the beauty  of  a  wetland  view  or  clean  air.  But  these  are  “goods”  that 
people care about and hold values for. In the absence of markets (such as real estate or travel, for 
example), economists can estimate these values by two different ways: observing information 
about related goods (indirect use values) or asking people about them (non-use values - direct 
methods) (Kanninen, 2006). These are the principles of two different approaches: the revealed 
preference and the stated preference, respectively. The indirect use values of wetlands are 
associated with EG&S that contribute to consumer utility and producer profits by supporting and 
preventing damage to a wide variety of economic activities (Scodari, 1997). These outputs 
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include pollution assimilation and detoxification; protection of property from damaging effects 
of floodwaters, storm, winds, and waves; and protection of navigable waterways from 
sedimentation. Generally, these benefits do not depend on active or intentional use. Because of 
this, some argue that the linkages between ecological services and economic activity are too 
indirect and nonspecific to assess wetland benefits using revealed-preference approaches 
(Scodari, 1997). The revealed-preference valuation techniques include travel cost and hedonic 
price methods (the hedonic price method is detailed in the following section).  
However, for some goods indirect use values techniques may not be appropriate for not all 
goods have observed information. Because these values are not systematically revealed in market 
choices, the valuation techniques require methods that directly ask people about their preferences 
(Scodari, 1997). The most commonly applied methods of eliciting values to those goods are the 
Contingent Valuation (CVM) and Choice Method (CM) (Train, 2002).  
 
2.7.3. Hedonic pricing   
Hedonic models identify price factors according to the premise that price is determined 
both by internal characteristics of the good being sold and external factors affecting it. This 
method has been applied to a wide range of goods and services in recent years. For example, 
Mahan et al. (2000) estimate the value of urban wetland amenities in the Portland Oregon 
metropolitan area using sales prices of residential housing. Housing prices have also been used in 
a range of studies to estimate values for urban green space (Kong et al., 2007), airport noise 
(Cohen & Coughlin, 2008; Dekkersa & van der Straaten, 2009), beetle infestation damage 
(Pricea et al., 2010) and air quality (Anselin & Lozano-Gracia, 2009). Hedonic pricing has also 
been applied to eliciting values of attributes of goods such as mobile phone (Dewenter et al., 
2007), personal digital assistants (Chwelosa et al., 2008), fresh tomatoes (Huang & Lin, 2007), 
water bottle size (Hea et al., 2008), French Canadian paintings (Hodgson, 2009), costal features 
attractiveness (Hamilton, 2007) and ski resort characteristics (Falk, 2008). Hedonic pricing also 
has come to play a growing role as a non-market valuation method applied in measuring 
ecosystem services. Consider a (marketed) good/service as a bundle of characteristics (example 
proposed by Mishra, 1998). A buyer has a demand for a number of these characteristics (maybe, 
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not all characteristics that the said bundle possesses) and pays for them. A decrease in the 
quantity or quality of the desired characteristics will lower the demand for the bundle 
(good/service) and thus will affect its price adversely and vice versa. In this vein, marketed 
products may be tied with some environmental goods/services. When a person buys those 
goods/services, he also buys the environmental goods/services tied with them. The buyer pays 
not only for the marketed goods/services, but also for the package that includes the linked 
environmental goods/services. A diminution of environmental goods/services, therefore, 
degrades the package and lowers its price. This fact is used by the hedonic pricing method for 
valuation of environmental goods and services. Therefore, this method is most suitable to assess 
the value of local environmental attributes (Mishra, 1998). It is used to estimate economic 
benefits or costs associated with environmental quality.  
While hedonic pricing has been used to estimate value for a range of goods and services, it 
is limited in that it is applicable only to valuation of those goods/services that are tied to a 
marketed goods/services and the prices of the latter respond to changes in the quality/quantity 
and attributes of the former. It is also assumed that nothing else modifies the relationship 
between them (Mishra, 1998). Further, this method demands a rich data base and reliable 
estimation methods. It is also susceptible to the choice of model specification used to estimation 
at hand. A wrong specification of the model or the method of estimation may easily 
underestimate or overestimate valuation of environmental goods/services (Mishra, 1998). This 
would raise a special concern for wetland valuation in Saskatchewan prairies, since there is very 
little information about marketed goods/services tied related with wetland attributes in privately 
owned land. 
 
2.7.4. Contingent  Valuation  Method (CVM) 
Contingent  Valuation  is  an  economic  valuation  technique,  which  directly  elicit  consumers’ 
preferences for some proposed market conditions. It can be grouped under the family of non-
market environmental valuation stated preference technique, which aims to quantify the EG&Ss 
of non-market attributes into monetary or market values (Pek, Tee, & Ng, 2010). CVM is 
survey-based and widely used. CVM was first proposed in theory by Ciriacy-Wantrup (1947) 
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and first applied by Davis (1963) to estimate the value hunters and tourists placed on a particular 
wilderness area. Since then, CVM has become more established and is currently a widely 
accepted technique (McLean & Mundy, 1998). Pattison (2009) for example, have used CVM to 
estimate values for wetland restoration and retention in the prairie pothole region of Manitoba, 
which estimated values between $290 (retention) and $360 (full restoration) per household per 
year. Roberts and Leitch (1997) determined the value of wetland services in Mud Lake, South 
Dakota to be $926 per hectare ($375 per acre) per year. Leitch and Hovde (1996) analyzed five 
prairie pothole wetlands in North Dakota, and found that WTP estimates varied from $10 to $921 
per hectare per year, depending upon the stakeholder perspectives and the wetland being 
considered 
Although contingent valuation methods are commonly used, it is also the most 
controversial of the non-market valuation methods. CVM requires people to respond to a specific 
hypothetical scenario; therefore, there is an assumption that respondents understood the good in 
question and answers the survey truthfully. Recently, many techniques have been created to 
minimize hypothetical bias caused by the assumptions above. The most popular possible 
solutions to this problem are cheap talk  (proposed by Cummings & Taylor, 1999); stat ist ical 
calibrat ion funct ions (demonstrated by Fox et al., 1998) and follow up certainty quest ions (see 
Champ et al., 1997). First, cheap talk explicitly states to participants the importance of truthful 
behaviour during the survey. Many authors found this technique efficient to reduce hypothetical 
bias (Lusk, 2003; Aadland & Caplan, 2003), while other found it efficient only for respondents 
facing relatively high payments (Murphy, Stevens, & Weatherhead, 2005), or only for 
inexperienced participants (List, 2001). Second, statistical calibration functions use laboratory 
experiments involving real payments to calibrate the survey data (Fox et al., 1998). However, 
List and Shogren (2002) argue that these functions are often thought to be commodity, context, 
and/or individual specific. Finally, Champ and Bishop (2001), Ethier et al. (2000) and Poe et al. 
(2002) have all used an uncertainty scale whereby uncertain WTP ‘yes‘  responses  are  recoded  as 
‘no‘.  Although  this  technique  has  proved  to  be  effective  in  many  situations,  the  cut-off point at 
which this practice works is arbitrary and varies among studies. Moreover, Wang (1997) found 
that treating uncertain responses as ‘no’  can underestimate mean WTP. Therefore, despite the 
existence of tools to minimize hypothetical bias in CVM studies, the literature is inconclusive 
about its efficiency (Aadland & Caplan, 2006).  
30 
 
2.7.5. Choice method  (CM) 
Similarly to CVM, CM uses surveys in hypothetical scenarios to estimate economic values. 
However, CM studies describe goods or services as a collection of attributes. By varying the 
attribute  levels,  the  researcher  creates  different  “goods.”  In other words, CM studies resemble 
experiments in which the researcher can manipulate attributes and levels to see how people react 
(Bateman, et al., 2005). CM studies represent an important form of experimentation that lies 
somewhere along the spectrum between laboratory experiments and observational studies 
(Harrison & List, 2004). Comparing the presented stated models, Boxall et al. (1996) found 
significant difference between CVM and CM used to value environmental quality changes 
arising from forest management practices on recreational moose hunting values, and suggested 
that CM may be more appropriate than CVM.  The method is particularly suitable for estimating 
marginal rates of substitution between different attributes of for example a wetland. For example, 
Morrison et al. (1999) applied a choice experiment to estimate non-use environmental values of a 
wetland area in Australia. In particular they investigate the trade-off between non-use values in 
job losses and environmental quality. In their study they created 4 different management 
scenarios with different levels of the attributes they were considering. The range of prices 
households were willing to pay for the hypothetical management scenarios was $22.36 – 
$102.62. In addition, their results indicated that while the existence values for improved 
environmental quality outweighed the existence values for rural employment (including 
employment effects has reduced WTP by 20-30% in the scenarios they considered). Other 
example of CM use for wetland valuation with the general objective of estimating WTP for 
wetland area itself, in particular the use and non-use values of improved environmental quality 
are Adamowicz et al. (1994). For instance, Carlsson et al. (2003) were more interested in valuing 
different wetland attributes, such as surrounding vegetation, biodiversity, fish, fenced waterline, 
crayfish and walking facilities in Staffanstorp, southern Sweden. These authors found 
heterogeneous preferences for several attributes, negative  mean  WTP  for  “meadow  land”, 
“fenced  waterlines”  and  “crayfish” and  the  highest  WTP  for  “Biodiversity”  and  “walking 
facilities”. 
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The use of CM for wetland valuation has been commonly applied in recent studies and 
with wide range of attributes and values. The results of these studies depend largely on the CM 
design. There are numerous different design options, and different actors may promote different 
alternatives. Whether researchers’ objectives are to design a wetland for nutrient retention alone, 
or provide policy makers information about the value of different options, by conducting a 
choice experiment, one is able to identify attributes that increase and decrease citizens perceived 
value of wetlands (Carlsson et al., 2003). The next chapter presents the analytical framework 
which provides the foundation for some of the research design options presented later in Chapter 
4 (which explore the Choice Method in detail).  
 
 
2.8. Summary  of the policy measurements  for wetland  conservation   
 
Wetlands provide an important range of EG&S to Saskatchewanians.  However, many of 
these EG&S are being undersupplied, or lost due to the inability of markets to efficiently provide 
the necessary incentives from a social welfare perspective. Thus, policy measures are established 
to help fill these gaps by balancing the perceived responsibilities and interests held by society 
and landowners for providing EG&S. Many policy mechanisms can be used for different 
purposes, with different features and implications, and in many situations a combination of them 
is desired for efficient outcomes. Economic incentives, for example, provide a wide variety of 
flexible cost efficient mechanisms for environmental improvement. Similarly, many valuation 
technics can be used to help in the development of economic incentive policies. For example, the 
choice model can provide important valuation information for wetlands located on privately 
owned agricultural land. This information is important for designing an effective economic 
incentive policy. Chapter 3 provides details of how the choice model can provide values for 
wetland conservation by presenting an analytical framework.  
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3. CHAPTER ­ ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
3.1.Introduction 
  
The demand for EG&S valuation to help inform development and policy decisions has 
experienced a significant increase in the past 10 to 15 years. One of the primary economic issues 
is the fact that by leaving resource management decisions to be determined by the market, 
EG&Ss will tend to be undersupplied (from a social welfare perspective) resulting in inefficient 
resource allocation. The under-supply of EG&S on the agricultural landscapes is often explained 
in economic terms as a market failure. For example, the under-provision of wetland EG&S in 
agricultural Saskatchewan (Johnson, et al., 2005). This chapter presents an analytical framework 
to help evaluate the costs and benefits associated with wetlands located on privately owned 
agricultural land. The framework will be applied to analyze the specific problem in the following 
chapter. The chapter will begin by discussing factors causing the market failure and the influence 
of market failure in allocating agriculture land. Then a graphical model will be developed to 
further illustrate the problem in wetland demand and supply and show how policy could be used 
to address the inefficiency. Finally, the framework is detailed in order to provide guidance on 
how policy makers can measure social wetland demand. 
 
3.1.1. Wetland  demand   
The literature indicates that market failures are the major reason wetland resources are 
undersupplied from a social welfare perspective. Within North American agricultural landscapes 
“the  vast  majority  of  the  land  and  therefore  the  wetlands  within  these  land  holdings  are  usually 
privately  owned”  (Farnese  and  Belcher,  2006).  In  most cases, the potential loss of EG&S from 
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wetlands is not factored into the decisions of those whose behaviour affects the wetland. That is, 
they  are  not  reflected  in  prices  paid  for  the  right  of  access  to  wetland  resources,  or  received  for 
the output of wetland-based activities. These losses of EG&S are external to the market. A 
consequence of this incomplete information is the extensive conversion of wetlands that has 
occurred over the last 50 plus years. Butler  and  Macey  explain,  “Since  individuals  in  a  market 
system respond only to the benefits and costs that they actually receive and pay for, the market 
system may be inadequate  to  deal  with  externalities”  (Lee,  2006, citing Butler and Macey). 
Baliga and Maskin (2003) argue that an allocation that maximizes the benefits to all of society 
will not be the outcome without government intervention when the externality is non-excludable 
(a pure public EG&S for example). Specifically, the major objective of government intervention 
in the context of these types of market failures is to encourage the increased supply of 
environmental goods and services through changing the land allocation to benefit society. The 
following section introduces a graphical model to further explain why wetland conversion 
actions happen and the role of public policies to address the problem. 
 
 
3.2. A Graphical  Model of Land Allocation 
 
This section presents a stylized framework that explains the factors determining the 
allocation of wetlands on Agricultural land. Described by Heimlich et al. (1998), the following 
diagrams (figures 3.1 which  presents  the  wetland  allocation  form  landowners’  perspective  only, 
and figure 3.2 which presents the wetland allocation after introducing social values) 
demonstrates how improve protection and converting wetlands translate into observed and 
optimal levels of wetland preservation and conversion by differing private and public incentives. 
The function (MB) describes the marginal benefit individual landowners realize with different 
allocations of land to wetland conservation or agricultural production. The vertical axis 
represents an index of value, such as dollars per hectare. The horizontal axis represents the total 
initial stock of wetland. This initial stock has subsequently been allocated to one of two 
categories: protected wetland area P (measured from the left-hand side) and area of land 
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converted from wetland to some other use C (measured from the right-hand side). Thus, the 
landowners MB decrease or increase according to whether wetlands are protected (P) or 
converted (C).  
Consider the net marginal benefit individual landowners realize by protecting an 
incremental hectare of wetland (MBpi)6. Examples include private scenic, recreational use values 
such as fishing or hunting, or economic returns from grazing or timber harvesting. Thus, as more 
wetland hectares are protected (moving from left to right), landowners’ marginal benefits for 
protecting an additional hectare of wetland decrease (figure 3.1a). Note that this curve is 
downward sloping because it assumes diminishing marginal utility for preservat ion. For 
example, imagine a landowner producing crops and having all his wetland drained. For this 
landowner, this model assumes that benefit for the first hectare protected is very high, but as 
more wetland are protected (and therefore the crop area is reduced) the marginal benefit for an 
extra unit of wetland protected decreases. Likewise, MBci would be expected to increase as the 
remaining area of protected wetlands decreases (moving from right to left). Therefore, the model 
also assumes increasing marginal utility for convert ing wetland into agriculture (MBc). For 
example, if a landowner has all his land protected (therefore not producing any agricultural 
commodity), the benefit for converting the first hectare of wetland into agriculture is assumed to 
be very high. However, as more wetland is drained (moving from right to left), the benefit of 
additional conversion diminishes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F igure  3.1. We tland allocation from the  landowners’ pe rspe ctive . 
 Source: adapted from Heimlich et a l ., (1998). 
                                                 
6 Due to conceptual and measurement difficulties, the true level and shape of this curve is not known with precision. 
The same is true for the other curves introduced below (Heimlich et a l ., 1998).   
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Now, Figure 3.1-b represents the net marginal benefit individual landowners realize by 
protecting wetlands, as presented in Figure 3.1a, and the marginal benefit realized by the 
landowner by converting an incremental hectare of wetlands to the production of agricultural 
commodities (MBci). In contrast to individual benefits from wetland protection, MBc may be 
relatively high, since conversion makes possible more intensive agricultural or developed uses 
that provide economic returns directly to the individual landowner through the sale of 
commodities. MBci would be expected to decline as the area of converted wetland increases 
(moving from right to left). The privately optimal allocation of the stock of wetlands is 
represented by the point (Qi*) where the two marginal benefit curves cross. At this point, 
protecting an additional hectare would cost more in terms of foregone benefits from conversion 
than would be gained in benefits from protection. Likewise, converting an additional hectare 
would cost more in terms of foregone benefits from protection than would be gained in benefits 
from conversion. This simple framework can be extended to illustrate the differences between 
the public and private incentives to protect and convert wetlands.  
Both conversion and protection generate public benefits as well as private benefits. In the 
case of wetland conversion to agricultural production, for example, these benefits may include 
increased agricultural output, lower consumer prices for food commodities and, in the 19th 
century, westward expansion and settlement (Heimlich et al., 1998). However, it is expected that 
public benefits to conversion are now small relative to private benefits since settlement has been 
accomplished and remaining wetlands are small relative to the cropland base. Adding these 
incremental public benefits, in the form of externalities (or external benefits) to the landowner, to 
the individual benefits curve MBci results in a social marginal benefit curve for conversion of 
MBcs (figure 3.2- a). 
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F igure  3.2. We tland allocation from the  private  de c is ion make r pe rspe ctive  afte r  introduc ing 
soc ial values . 
Source: adapted from Heimlich et a l ., (1998). 
 
In the case of wetland protection, on the other hand, there are significant externalities, or 
social benefits provided. Examples of these benefits that tend not to be realized by the private 
landowner include flood control, water quality improvement, fish and wildlife habitat, and 
recreational opportunities. Adding these externalities to the individual marginal benefits curve 
MBpi results in the significantly higher social marginal benefit curve for protection of MBps, as 
depicted in figure 3.2-b. Thus, external benefits are represented by the shift from MBpi to MBps. 
Denoted in equation, MBps = MBpi + externalities. The socially optimal allocation of the initial 
stock of wetlands (Qs*) thus occurs to the right of the privately optimal allocation (Qi*), 
representing relatively more wetlands protected and less converted than under the privately 
optimal allocation. According to this model to increase social welfare, more wetland and riparian 
areas must be conserved with less land allocated to agricultural production. Since external social 
benefits are not reflected in the market, and as such landowners fail to receive adequate 
incentives to increase wetland conservation to socially optimal levels, government policies may 
be required to enable the market to provide the maximum social welfare. 
The model discussed above provides a general conceptual picture for understanding the 
allocation of land within an agricultural landscape. For individual landowners, they will stop 
converting wetlands when the marginal benefits of converting are equivalent to the marginal 
benefits of protecting. Due to the market inefficiency problem of wetlands, there exists a gap 
between the actual and the socially optimal allocation of land between protected and converted 
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wetland. To minimize the divergence, policy measures can be implemented. However, the 
framework provides little guidance on how policy makers can measure society wetland demand. 
Therefore, the development of appropriate policy requires information on the values that society 
holds for the EG&S provided by wetlands which are considered below. 
 
 
3.3. Theoretical Support  of Behavioral Model 
 
The principle that in the presence of externalities goods are not efficiently allocated by 
market suggests the possibility of improvement by public action. The graphical model, presented 
earlier, provided the framework for the possibility of improvement of resource allocation. 
However, for a policy perspective the benefits from public action (e.g. required to shift MB up) 
should exceed the costs of the action in order to be worthwhile. In other words, the benefits 
acquired from the improvement necessary to bring the privately optimal allocation (Qi*) to the 
socially optimal allocation (Qs*) should exceed the costs of such change.  
There are two ways to describe the monetary magnitude of a welfare measure. First, 
compensating variation can be defined as the amount of income paid or received that leaves the 
person at the initial level of well-being, or equivalent variation which is the amount of income 
paid or received that leaves the person at the final level of well-being. Second, willingness to 
pay/accept is the maximum amount of income a person will pay/accept in exchange of a good or 
service (including environmental improvement). As Haab and McConnell (2003) state, both 
mechanism measures the same phenomenon:  “the increment in income that makes a person 
indifferent to an exogenous change, where the change might be price change, a quality change, 
or a change in some public good”. Analytically, the relationship between these welfare measures 
can be expressed according to the equation (3.1) (described by Haab and McConnell, 2003). 
V(p, q*, y – WTP) = V(p, q, y)        (3.1) 
Where q is the vector of public goods and services being provided by the vector price, p, 
subjected to income, y; and, V(∙) is the indirect utility function. Within the context presented in 
section  3.2,  it’s  possible  to  consider  the  socially optimal allocation (Qs*) as q* and the privately 
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optimal allocation (Qi*) as q at equation (3.1). Therefore, q* ≥  q,  and  holding everything else 
constant,  an  increase  in  q  is  desirable  (∂V/∂q  >  0).  Equation (3.1) also restates the WTP7 role in 
the model as the amount of income an individual would give up to make him indifferent between 
the original state and the socially optimal allocation (at q*). The WTP for a price change (let the 
price vector decline) is defined as (Haab & McConnell, 2003): 
WTP = m(p, q, u) – m(p*, q, u) when u = V(p, q, y)      (3.2) 
The variables in which individual state their preference are p and q. However, the 
economic decision with regard to q and p choices for an individual is often complex. According 
to Louviere et al. (2000), there are several steps when individuals decide the goods and prices for 
their consumption. Consumers first become aware of their consumption needs which are 
followed by a period of information search in which they learn about products that can satisfy 
these needs. During this stage, beliefs about the available products to attain their objectives are 
formed by consumers. The product attributes contribution to a choice and the attributes values 
offered by products as well as any associated uncertainty become important in this stage. 
Eventually, consumers gather enough information to form a utility function, which involves 
valuing and trading off products attributes that matter in the decision. Finally, if consumers 
decide to purchase one or more alternatives must be chosen in certain quantities and with 
particular timing of the purchase.  
However, economists are mainly interested in market demand. The fact that each 
individual makes consumption decisions based on individual needs, and that these decisions are 
complex, makes the relationship between market and individual demand even more complicated 
(Louviere, Hensher & Swait, 2000). For example, McFadden (1979) showed that the utility 
maximization allow the possibility that unobserved attributes of individuals can vary over 
population in such a way that they obscure the implications of the individual behaviour mode. To 
advance this discussion, a general procedure for formulating models of population choice 
behaviour from distributions of decision rules in the population when commodities are discrete is 
developed below.   
                                                 
7 The present section provide general considerations of the WTP within the framework. For more detail of how the 
WTP is estimated in the Choice model, see section 3.4.4.  
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3.4.Choice Model (CM) Specification 
 
The measurement approach adopted in this thesis can provide important information to 
policy makers about social preferences for EG&S. CM8 is consistent with random utility theory 
(RUT), which can be derived as follows (McFadden, 1979)9. Consider a decision maker (e.g. a 
Saskatchewan resident), n, faces a choice among J alternatives (e.g. conservation programs, or 
wetland EG&S). The decision maker would obtain a certain level of utility from each alternative. 
The utility that decision maker n obtains from alternative j is Unj10, j = 1, . . ., J . The decision 
maker chooses the alternative that provides the greatest utility. Within the behavioural model 
alternative i is chosen if and only if Uni >  Unj, for all j ≠  i (Train, 2002). Note that the individual 
utility is known by the decision maker but not by the researcher. 
The researcher observes some attributes of the alternatives faced by the decision maker, xnj, 
and some attributes of the decision maker, sn, and can specify a function that relates these 
observed  factors  to  the  decision  maker’s  utility.  This  function  follows a strictly additive form 
denoted Vnj = V(xnj , sn), and is often called representat ive ut ility (Train, 2002). Note that, V 
depends on parameters that are unknown to the researcher and therefore estimated statistically. 
Since, by using CM some of this unobservable consumer utility can be explained and some 
proportion remains unexplained, Vnj ≠ Unj. In fact, 
Unj= Vnj + εnj         (3.3) 
Where Unj is the latent, unobserved utility for choice alternative, Vnj is the systematic, 
observable component of the latent utility and εnj is the random component of the latent utility 
associated with option j and consumer n (Train, 2002). The term εnj is unknown, and therefore it 
is treated as random. The joint density of the random vector, εn, leads to the expression of the 
probability of choice (Train, 2002): 
                                                 
8 See section 2.7.5 for a brief comparison between two of the most common stated preference methods (CVM and 
CM).  
9 McFadden (1979) is seminal to the development of discrete choice models, His work on CM was awarded with the 
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2000. Later, Train (2002) didactically describe CM in a text book.   
10 Unj can be formally defined as the ut i l i ty individual n obtain when choosing a l terna t ive j. 
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Pni = Prob[(Vni + εni) > (Vnj + εnj)]      (3. 4) 
= Prob(εnj − εni <  Vni − Vnj ) 
 
= ∫ε  I (εnj − εni <  Vni − Vnj) f (εn) dεn       (3. 5) 
 
for all j ≠ i,  
Pni is the probability individual n chooses the alternative i. I (·) is the indicator function, 
equalling 1 when the expression in parentheses is true and 0 otherwise. This is a 
multidimensional integral over the density of the unobserved portion of utility, f (εn). But, what is 
meant by the distribution of εn? 
The interpretation that the researcher places on this density affects the interpretation of the 
choice probabilities. The most transparent way to think about this distribution is described by 
Train (2002), as follows. Consider a population of people who face the same observed utility Vnj 
j as person n. Among these people, the values of the unobserved factors differ. The density f 
(εn) is the distribution of the unobserved portion of utility within the population of people who 
face the same observed portion of utility. Under this interpretation, the probability Pni is the share 
of people who choose alternative i within the population of people who face the same observed 
utility for each alternative as person n. The distribution can also be considered in subjective 
terms,  as  representing  the  researcher’s  subjective  probability  that  the  person’s  unobserved  utility 
will take given values. In this case, Pni is the probability that the researcher ascribes to the 
person’s  choosing  alternative  i given  the  researcher’s  ideas  about  the  unobserved  portions  of  the 
person’s  utility.  As  a  third  possibility,  the  distribution  can  represent  the  effect of factors that are 
quixotic to the decision maker himself (representing, e.g., aspects of bounded rationality), so that 
Pni is the probability that these quixotic factors induce the person to choose alternative i given 
the observed, non-quixotic factors. 
Different discrete choice models are obtained from different specifications of this density, 
that is, from different assumptions about the distribution of the unobserved portion of utility. 
Examples of models derived from the specifications of the density function include Logit, Nested 
Logit, Mixed Logit, and Probit. Logit and nested logit have close-form expressions for the 
intergral, f(·). These models are under the assumption that the unobserved portion of utility is 
distributed iid extreme value (logit) and a type of generalized extreme value (nested logit). On 
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the other hand, Mixed logit and Probit are more flexible due to their open-from expression for 
the integral, f(·). Mixed logit models are derived under the assumption that the unobserved 
portion of utility consists of a part that follows any distribution specified by the researches plus a 
part that is iid extreme value. Probit models are based on the assumption that the unobserved 
factors are distributed jointly normal. Despite less flexible, logit models are relatively easy to 
apply and very popular. This study opted for two models, a close-form easier to use and popular 
logit, more especially the condit ional logit model and a more flexible mixed logit, the random 
parameter logit .  The assumptions made for the condit ional logit model and random parameter 
logit, as well as its strength and weakness are considered in more detail at the sections below. 
 
3.4.1.  Conditional  logit derivation 
According to Train (2002), logit models are by far the most widely used discrete choice 
models. Among the reasons for this popularity is that logit is relatively easy to apply, the formula 
for  the  choice  probability  takes  a  convenient  closed  form  and  it’s  readily  interpretable. For 
example, the representative utility for the logit is specified to be linear in parameters: Vnj = β’xnj, 
where xnj is a vector of observed variables (all attributes) relating to alternative j. Therefore, the 
probability that respondent n picks alternative i out of all alternatives under the logit model is: 
 
          (3.6)  
However, the most important assumption of the logit is that the error term for individual n 
choosing alternative i (εni) is independently, identically distributed (iid) extreme value for all i. In 
fact, the logit model is derived from this assumption11 (Train, 2002). Note that according to 
equation (3.5), the model is interested in the differences between error terms, and the difference 
between two extreme value variables (e.g. . εnj − εni) is distributed logistic. In other words, “if εnj 
                                                 
11 The logistic function was invented in 19th century for the description of the growth of populations and the course 
of autocatalytic chemical reactions. Despite, only in 1973 the multinomial logit is linked to the theory of discrete 
choice from mathematical phycology, which is credited to McFadden (1974). For a detailed history of the logit 
model see Cramer (2003). 
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and εni are iid ex treme value, then ε*nji =  εnj − εni follows the logist ic distribut ion” (Train, 2002 
p.39).  
There are many desirable properties that the logit model exhibits. First, Pni (equation 3.4) is 
necessarily between zero and one, as required for a probability. However, the logit probability 
for an alternative is never exactly zero, since if the alternative has actually no chance of being 
chosen by a decision maker, the researcher can exclude that alternative from the choice set 
(Train, 2002). Second, the choice probabilities for all alternatives sum to one ( ). In 
other words, the decision maker necessarily chooses one of the alternatives. Finally, the relation 
of the logit probability to representative utility is sigmoid, or S-shaped, as shown in Figure 3. 
This shape has implications for the impact of changes in explanatory variables. Note that in a 
sigmoid function, changes in Vni have little impact in the probability of participant n choosing 
alternative i when preferences are strong. In other words, if one alternative is far superior or very 
low compared with other alternatives in observed attributes, a further increase in its 
representative utility has little effect on the choice probability. However, if probability, Pni, is 
close to 0.5 (50–50 chance of the alternative being chosen), small changes in Vni have large 
impact in the probability of the alternative being chosen (Train, 2002). These impacts of changes 
in explanatory variables due to the sigmoid shape of logit probabilities is shared by most discrete 
choice models and also has important implications for policy makers. For example, improving 
wetland services in areas where the services are so limited that few people have access to the 
benefits would be less effective, than making the same improvement in areas where wetland 
services are already sufficiently good to induce a moderate share of people to choose it (but not 
so good that nearly everyone does). The policy insights from the models used in this study is 
presented on chapter 5. 
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F igure  3.3. Graph of logit curve . 
Source: Train (2002).  
 
However, the key restrictive assumption responsible for the development of other models 
it’s  not  the  shape  of  the  distribution,  but  that  errors  are  independent  from  each  other.    In  other 
words, the unobserved portion of utility for one alternative is unrelated to the unobserved portion 
of utility for any other alternative. For example, in a wetland experiment, the unobserved factors 
that makes participant choose to conserve wildlife population must not be correlated to the 
unobserved factor for water quality. A situation where wildlife habitat and water quality errors 
may actually be correlated is when participants believe that improving water quality can lead to 
an increase in wildlife population and this is not captured in the specified model (for example V, 
equation 3.4). The next section discusses this assumption in more detail. 
 
3.4.2. Independence  from  Irrelevant Alternatives  (IIA) 
Independence from irrelevant alternatives is a property of the conditional logit model, and 
it’s  often  the  reason  for  researchers  to choose other models. The popularity of the logit model is 
due to the convenient closed form, which assumes independence from irrelevant alternatives. 
However, this assumption can be inappropriate in some situations. Consider the ratio of the logit 
probabilities (Pni/Pnk) for any two alternatives (i and k). According to the definition of IIA, this 
ratio does not depend on any alternatives other than i and k . Whether IIA holds in a particular 
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setting is an empirical question, amenable to statistical investigation (the test for IIA as applied 
in the present study is detailed in Appendix C). 
For instance, consider the following situation. Consumers of a resort initially face a 
decision between two recreational activities: ride a horse or a quad bike. Suppose that a 
consumer chooses between these two options with equal probability, 0.5, so that the odds ratio 
equals 1. Now suppose a third option, a mare with the same physical and riding characteristics of 
the horse, is added. Assuming rider consumers  do  not  care  about  the  horses’  gender,  consumers 
are expected to choose between horse and quad still with equal probability, so the probability of 
quad is still 0.5, while the probabilities of each of the two animals is 0.25. But IIA implies that 
this is not the case: for the odds ratio between quad and male horse to be preserved, the new 
probabilities must be: quad 0.33; horse 0.33; mare 0.33. In intuitive terms, the problem with the 
IIA axiom is that it leads to a failure to take account of the fact that riding horse or mare are very 
similar, and are "perfect substitutes". 
3.4.3. Random  Parameter  Logit (RPL) Model 
Differently from the conditional logit model, that considered parameters (βs) fixed (see 
equation 3.6), the RPL model considers βn to be random. Therefore, the utility of person n from 
alternative j is specified as  
,          (3.7) 
where xnj are observed variables that relate to the alternative and decision maker, βn is a vector of 
coefficients of these variables for person n representing  that  person’s  tastes,  and  εnj is a random 
term that is iid extreme value (Train, 2002). This specification is the same as for standard logit 
except that β varies over decision makers rather than being fixed (Train, 2002). 
Note that βn cannot condition on β, since βn is unknown. The unconditional choice 
probability is therefore the integral of equation (3.7) over all possible variables of βn: 
,          (3.8) 
For the purpose of this study, f (β) is assumed to be normal.  According to Train (2002) 
most applications, such as Revelt and Train (1998), Mehndiratta (1996), and Ben-Akiva and 
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Bolduc (1996), f (β) has been specified to be normal (more recent examples include: Train, 1998; 
Morey & Rossmann, 2003; Carlsson, Frykblom, & Liljenstolpe, 2003). 
Comparing  the  RPL  with  the  conditional  logit  model,  it’s  important  to  notice  that  by 
allowing coefficients to be random, the RPL accounts for correlation of error terms. In other 
words, RPL is more flexible and appropriate when the logit model is not adequate due to 
independence of irrelevant alternative (IIA) problem. For example, if researchers suspect that 
there are unobserved factors (e.g. increasing water quality) that affect the choice of other 
attributes (also increases wildlife population) that is not accounted in the model, the logit will be 
biased,  but the RPL won’t (Louviere et al., 2000).  
 
3.4.4.  Estimation  of Willingness  to Pay 
The estimation of willingness to pay in choice models often considered the calculus of the 
implicit price and compensating surplus. The implicit price for EG&S provided by wetlands 
describes the choice alternatives on a ceteris paribus basis. That is, they are estimations of the 
WTP of respondents for an increase in the attribute of concern, given that everything else is held 
constant (Do and Bennett, 2007). In other words, implicit prices are the marginal rates of 
substitution between the attribute of interest and the monetary attribute. This is equal to the ratio 
of the coefficient of one of the non-monetary attributes and the monetary attributes, as follows 
(Train, 2002): 
Implicit price = - (βnon-market attribute/βmonetary attribute),    (3.9) 
where β are the coefficients  estimated  in  the model. 
However, the implicit prices do not provide estimates of compensating surplus (CS) for the 
alternative management scenarios. For policy analysis, the researcher is often interested in 
measuring the change in compensanting surplus that is associated with a particular policy. 
Compensating surplus, in choice modeling, is used to quantify the changes to individual welfare 
that result from different management scenarios. For example, if a new alternative is being 
considered, such as wetland improvement in a municipality, then it is important to measure the 
benefits of the project to see if these social benefits warrant the costs (Do & Bennett, 2007), in 
other words, has net social welfare increased with the wetland improvement project. Similarly, a 
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change in the attributes of an alternative can have an impact on compensating surplus that is 
important to assess. Degradation of the water quality of rivers harms the anglers who can no 
longer fish as effectively at the damaged sites. Measuring this harm in monetary terms is a 
central element of legal action against the polluter (Train, 2002). Whitten (2003, p.275) further 
states  “compensat ing surplus is the appropriate est imate of the willingness to pay for a change 
from the current situat ion”. 
Under the logit assumptions, the compensating surplus associated with a set of alternatives 
takes  a  closed  form  that  is  easy  to  calculate.  By  definition,  a  person’s compensating surplus is the 
utility, in dollar terms, that the person receives in the choice situation. The decision maker 
chooses the alternative that provides the greatest utility. In simple terms, Do and Bennett (2007) 
presented the following: 
CS = -(1/ β monetary) (V1-V2)         (3.10) 
where V1 is the value of the indirect utility12 associated with the status quo; V2 is the 
indirect utility associated with the specific levels of the attributes describing the changed 
resource allocation, and; β is the coefficients estimated in the model. 
CS from logit estimates allows policy makers to measure society wetland demand for 
different management scenarios. This information can be used to address issues related to 
wetland market failure. Chapter 4 describes the materials and method used in this study in order 
to apply the presented framework.  
 
 
3.5. Analytical  framework  Summary   
 
The under-supply of EG&S on the agricultural landscapes is often explained in economic 
terms as a market failure. This failure may occur due to external factors (also known as 
externalities) that shift the environmental supply and/or demand curve away from the optimal 
equilibrium. Therefore, the inefficiency of the markets creates a gap between the actual and the 
                                                 
12 As explained earlier, Vnj = β’xnj for the Conditional Logit Model and    for the Random Parameter 
Logit Model. 
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socially optimal land allocation for protected wetland. The development of appropriate policy 
can help to correct such inefficiency, however; it requires information on the values that society 
holds for the EG&S provided by wetlands. Consistent with Random Utility Theory, this study 
considers two choice models for eliciting values for wetland in Saskatchewan. First, wetland 
attributes are framed in an approach where features that the model cannot capture are assumed to 
be independent from other attributes. Despite being commonly used, this assumption is very 
simple, and can be a problem due to the complexity of wetlands ecosystem functions. Addressing 
the IIA problem, the RPL model was considered. This model allows unobserved factor of 
attributes to be correlated without affecting the valuation outcome. According to theory, the 
calculation of willingness to pay for wetland attributes is possible with the estimation of both 
models. Nevertheless, this theoretical approach needs to be re-assessed according to the data 
collected. For example, the data can indicate whether conditional or RPL is an appropriate 
model. Thus, chapter 4 describes the methodology used for data collection and wetland 
valuation.   
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4. CHAPTER – RESEARCH MATERIALS AND METHODS  
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction   
 
As described by the analytical model, the socially optimal allocation of the stock of 
wetlands can be achieved if landowners receive appropriate incentives. Government policies can 
be used to enable the market to provide the maximum social welfare. Developing such policies 
requires an understanding of society’s  perspective  on  wetland  EG&Ss, and they can be 
accomplished econometrically through stated preference methods. This chapter is focused on the 
administration of a stated choice (SC) survey. First, a short description of the study area is 
presented. Second, the sample design is explained and the SC survey for this study is 
synthesized. The following section presents the process of selecting the individuals to receive the 
survey and briefly describe how that data is handled. Finally, a summary of the chapter is 
provided. 
 
 
4.2.  The study area13 
 
Two major natural regions compose the province of Saskatchewan. The Laurentian Plateau 
(or Canadian Shield) is located in the northern area of the province, and is mostly covered by 
boreal forest (except for the Lake Athabasca Sand Dunes). Southern Saskatchewan, however, is 
where the interior plain (or Laurentian craton) is located. The southern plain is extremely 
important, economically, to the province, since abundant natural resources and the majority of 
                                                 
13 Note that this study is limited to Saskatchewan since the primary objective is to help inform the development of 
effective policy to provide EG&S in the agricultural landscape of the province. 
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population are located here. Accounting for approximately $11 billion of value of production, 
Saskatchewan is one of the most important agricultural provinces in Canada (Statistics Canada, 
2011). According to the 2006 census, 46% of the total land area in Saskatchewan is farm, and 
58% farm land is dedicated for crops (see figure 4.1). Wheat is, perhaps, the most common crop 
in Saskatchewan (covering 35% of the 2006 crop area), but other grains like oats, canola, rye, 
peas, barley, lentils, canary seed and flax are also produced. 
 
 
F igure  4.1. Sask atchewan land use  dis tribution.  
Source: adapted from Ministry of Saskatchewan (2006). 
 
Agriculture, on privately owned land, is the dominant land use in southern Saskatchewan 
and agricultural production can provide a wide range of EG&Ss. Among the examples of EG&S 
that a well-managed agricultural land can provide are fish, wildlife habitat, scenic views, and 
purification of air and water through natural processes. Wetlands are an important source of 
EG&S in Saskatchewan agricultural land.  However, agricultural development has imposed 
environmental costs for provincial society. Eleven  percent  of  Canada’s  wetland  are in 
Saskatchewan  and  it’s  estimated  there  are  about  1.5  million  wetlands  covering  1.7  million 
hectares (4.2 million acres) in the agricultural region of the province (SWA, 2010). Wetlands 
historically covered up to 23% of the provincial land area, but it is estimated that 50-70% of 
these wetlands have been lost or altered, primarily due to agricultural drainage and cultivation.  
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The survey used in this study targets society’s  preferences  towards  EG&S  provided  by 
wetlands  in  Saskatchewan’s  agricultural  landscape.  More  specifically,  the  survey  is  designed  to 
capture society’s  perception  of  the  level of responsibilities that society and landowners have in 
providing EG&S, and the values of these goods to inform the development of appropriate policy. 
The EG&Ss considered include those provided by increasing riparian areas, wildlife population 
and water quality (section 4.3.1 describes these EG&Ss in more detail).    
 
 
4.3.The survey development 
 
The survey instrument used in the present research was developed to elicit attitudes and 
values of Saskatchewan residents towards a range of EG&S provided by prairie wetlands. 
However, before being applied, the survey instrument was reviewed for any potential harm that 
the questions could cause to all the agents directly or indirectly involved in this process. After 
inspection, the survey was approved by the University of Saskatchewan Behavioural Research 
Ethics Board in May, 2010.   
The structure of the survey included a consent form14to ensure that each respondent 
understood the nature of the survey and the implications and risks involved on completing the 
survey. The consent form briefly introduced the researchers responsible for the study and 
formally invited participants to voluntarily express their true opinions. The consent form also 
stated the study purpose and procedure, potential benefits and risks, how the data will be stored 
and the commitment from the researchers to maintain confidentiality of any particular 
information that is not of public interest. Participants were also given the right to withdraw from 
the study for any reason, at any time during the survey answering process, without penalty of any 
sort. Participants that decided to withdraw had all the data that they contributed destroyed.  
The body of the survey was composed by four different sections. The first section provided 
the respondent with a brief discussion of wetland degradation in Saskatchewan.  This section 
also provided a description of the wetland attributes that the respondent needed to respond to 
                                                 
14See the consent form in Appendix A. 
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within the survey. The introduction of wetland degradation is important and was meant to 
provide some context to participants. In fact, some research suggests that contexts can also 
provide an incentive for participant to behave truthfully when responding to survey questions 
(Champ et al., 1997). Likewise, participants must have a good understanding of the attributes, 
since in the survey they are asked to make trade-off decisions in the choice experiment section. 
In the second section of the survey the choice experiment is presented to respondents. When 
comparing to the other sections in the survey, the choice model requires  a more involved 
consideration of preferences on the part of the participants since this section primarily considers 
trade-offs scenarios. Despite being a shorter survey (expected time of completion was 10-15 
min.), it was considered important to present the set of choices early in the survey to avoid 
completion mistakes due to tiredness. The third section of the survey focuses on measuring the 
perceived level of responsibilities that landowners and society have to protect wetlands in 
agricultural areas was presented. This section is shorter, and the time expended in each question 
of this section is also expected to be lower than the previews. In the last section of the survey 
respondents were asked to provide a range of demographic information used to help understand 
the characteristics of the respondents which can be used to contrast the characteristics of the 
sample population with those of the provincial population as provided by census data. The 
demographic information can also be used to identify heterogeneity in preferences (see section 
5.6). The demographic section was designed to be straightforward, and was not expected to be 
time demanding. The survey ends with a space to participants openly express they thoughts (if 
any). Each of the survey sections above are discussed in more detail below. 
 
4.3.1. Attributes  description  and  the choice set 
Prior to the Choice Experiment development, an introduction to the wetland degradation in 
Saskatchewan and the attribute description was presented. The introduction section of the survey 
is concise since the main purpose is to provide participants with some context but avoiding 
respondent fatigue and incentives to skip parts of the survey. Nevertheless, some historical 
information of the wetland degradation is provided as background information. The background 
52 
information provided is the drainage loss that has occurred in Saskatchewan due to poor 
conservation management on wetlands.  
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the Choice Model (CM) technique was chosen as the 
most appropriate to quantify the value of EG&S provided by wetlands in the agricultural 
landscapes of Saskatchewan.  The CM approach involves asking survey respondents to choose 
their most preferred resource use option from a number of alternatives. The advantages of CM 
over other non-market valuation techniques (e.g. contingent rating, contingent ranking, 
contingent valuation method) include the potential to provide a richer data set, strategic bias  - 
reduction, benefit transfer potential, framing effect control and context flexibility (Bennett and 
Adamowicz, 2001; Do and Bennett, 2007). However, this tool also requires people to respond to 
a specific hypothetical scenario; therefore, there is an assumption that respondents understood 
the good in question and answered the survey truthfully. Recently, many techniques have been 
created to minimize hypothetical bias caused by these assumptions.  Techniques that have shown 
some promise in addressing this problem are cheap talk  (proposed by Cummings & Taylor, 
1999) and follow up certainty quest ions (see Champ et al., 1997). First, cheap talk explicitly 
states to participants the importance of truthful behaviour during the survey. Many authors found 
this technique efficient to reduce hypothetical bias (Lusk, 2003; Aadland & Caplan, 2003).  
Thus, respondents were presented with a cheap talk section. The cheap talk section developed in 
the survey was based on that proposed by Aadland and Caplan (2006) and Do and Bennett 
(2007). This section had the objective of reducing hypothetical bias, potentially present on any 
survey. The cheap talk used in this project is translated below.  
 
“As  you  prepare  to  answer  the  next  few  questions,  please  keep  in  mind  that  previous 
surveys suggest that the amounts that people SAY they are willing to pay are somet imes different 
from the amounts that they would ACTUALLY be willing to pay when conservat ion opt ions 
became available in their community. For this reason, please imagine your household is 
ACTUALLY paying the amount you choose.” 
 
In addition to the cheap talk section, a follow up certainty question was included in the 
survey with the objective of reducing possibilities of hypothetical bias. According to Champ et 
al. (1997), improvement in the results may be acquired if only participants that stated to be 
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confident are considered in the model estimates. The follow up certainty question consists of 
providing participants with the opportunity to express how comfortable they were answering the 
set of choice questions (see appendix B, page 115). Participants were asked to measure how sure 
they were about their choices on a scale from one (very unsure) to ten (very sure). Participants 
that chose 4 or below were removed from further analysis and the results from the sample with 
all  participants  and  “just  sure”  participants  (above  4)  were  compared (results from this question 
can be found at section 5.4). 
The bundle of EG&S to be valued in this study are those that are provided directly or 
indirectly  by  wetlands  on  Saskatchewan’s  privately owned agricultural land. Significant wetland 
attributes pertaining to the Saskatchewan agricultural area were identified in consultation with 
ecologists and agricultural and environmental economists at the University of Saskatchewan. 
Importantly however, adding attribute or levels to the model will increase the information 
available to researchers, but also can make respondents fatigued as they are asked to complete a 
longer survey, decreasing the quality of the results (Train, 2002). There is no ideal number of 
levels and attributes. Commonly used in the choice method applications for valuing wetlands, the 
present study prioritizes a shorter set of choice scenarios and opted for four attributes with 
different levels. The following attributes were identified as providing the most relevant to the 
present research. 
- Riparian Area: are those areas located immediately beside wetlands, stream and rivers. 
The option for riparian area as an attribute is mainly due to the importance for 
providing ecosystem function to wetlands. Research has shown that wider riparian 
areas can provide greater levels of EG&S such as filtration of soil sediment, pesticides 
and nutrients from runoff water and wildlife habitat. The levels considered for this 
attribute in the survey are: 
o 5 metre riparian zone - vegetated riparian zone: Will provide very limited 
buffering of sediment, pesticides and nutrients, will provide very limited 
additional wildlife habitat.   
o 10 metre riparian zone - vegetated riparian zone: Establishment of perennial 
grasses in riparian zone to act as a buffer zone to decrease erosion and increase 
water quality, as well as providing some wildlife habitat.  
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o 20 metre riparian zone - vegetated riparian zone: In most cases provides very 
significant decreases in sediment, nutrient and pesticide entering the wetland 
and the riparian zone also provides habitat for wildlife. 
- Wildlife Population: wetlands are an essential part of the life cycle of many wildlife 
species found in the agricultural zone of Saskatchewan. The levels for Wildlife 
population in the survey are: 
o No act ion - with no specific conservation action, the wildlife habitat may 
continue to be converted to agricultural production and wildlife populations that 
depend of prairie wetlands may decrease.  
o Maintenance - low level of preservation actions would maintain the current 
level of wildlife population. 
o High - high level of preservation actions would increase the current level of 
wildlife population by 10%. 
- Water Quality15: A Boil Water Advisory is a public warning stating that the water 
supplied in a specific location may be unsafe for human consumption. This means that 
prior to drinking, cooking, or even brushing your teeth, the water must be brought to a 
rolling boil for a specified amount of time. These advisories are sometimes referred to 
as Precautionary Drinking Water Advisories. The more serious boil water orders are 
issued in the event of a water sample testing positive for biological, physical, or 
chemical contaminants. Examples would be if the coliform count exceeds provincial 
standards, or if the turbidity levels are too high. These orders are issued when there is a 
confirmed problem with the water that could pose as a health concern to those 
consuming it.  For example, on March 18th, 2010, Regional Health Authorities and the 
Saskatchewan Ministry of Environment had 244 boil-water advisories– 183 were 
precautionary and 61 were emergency boil water orders. The levels for this attribute in 
the survey are: 
                                                 
15 As the present date and to our knowledge, boil water advisory has never been used as parameter for water quality 
standards in wetland studies in Saskatchewan. Nevertheless as public warning of water quality, boil water advisory 
was found to be measurable, relevant do society, easily communicable. This study understands that boil water 
advisory satisfactorily fulfill the requirements for a choice model attribute.  
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o No change – current pattern of boil water advisories continue with no 
anticipated decline and a potential for an increase in boil water advisories in 
future years.  
o Improve 10%:- Land and water management actions targeting an increase in 
water quality as demonstrated by a decrease in boil-water advisories by 10%. 
o Improve 40%: Land and water management actions targeting an increase in 
water quality as demonstrated by a decrease in boil-water advisories by 40%. 
- Price: representing a one-time payment to compensate the landowners for adopting 
conservation management. The levels of payment used in this study included $0 (no 
payment required); $5; $10; $50; $100; $250, and; $500.  
The levels of each attribute were also determined in consultation with wetland experts as 
well as CM experts from the University of Saskatchewan and the Saskatchewan Ministry of 
Agriculture. To select the payment levels described above, three criteria were used: i) good 
coverage - the payment vehicle should have applicability and relevance across the studied 
population; ii) acceptability -the payment vehicle should be widely acceptable to the 
respondents, and; iii) feasibility - it is not too costly and complicated to implement in a real 
world application.  
A large number of unique wetland management scenarios can be constructed from the 
selected four attributes and 3 or 4 levels (Louviere, Hensher, & Swait, 2000)16. Experimental 
design techniques and the software Stat ist ical Analysis System (SAS) were used to obtain an 
orthogonal design, which consisted of only the main effects, and resulted in 18 pair-wise 
comparisons of alternative wetland management scenarios, which generated 9 choice sets. Each 
set contained two wetland management scenario profiles and an option to select neither scenario. 
Such  an  “opt  out”  option  can  be  considered  as  a  status  quo or  baseline  alternative, since choosing 
this option implies no change in EG&S provision and payments. The inclusion in the choice sets 
of  an  “opt  out”  option  is instrumental to achieving welfare measures that are consistent with 
demand theory (Louviere, Hensher, & Swait, 2000; Bennett & Blamey, 2001). The respondents 
were  told  that  if  they  chose  the  “opt  out”  scenario  option,  there would be no requirement of 
                                                 
16 The full factorial design for these attributes and levels can be calculated as following: LA , where L is the number 
of levels and A is the number of attributes. Thus, since the present study has three attributes with three levels each 
(33) and one attribute with 7 levels (71), the total number of possible unique scenarios is 7x27=189. 
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payment ($0 payment), however there would also not be any active wetland management, in 
which case the respondent would understand that wetland and EG&S conditions would 
deteriorate to lower levels for riparian area, wildlife population and water quality attributes. An 
example of a choice set used in the survey instrument is presented below.  The full survey with 
all nine choice sets is included in this thesis in Appendix B. 
 
Table  4.1. Sample  Choice  se t. 
Scenar io: Suppose options A , B and C are the O NLY ones avai lable  
The following factors will vary under 
different management options 
OPTIO N A OPTIO N B OPTIO N C 
 
Ripar ian Buffer  10 metre 20 metre 0 metre 
 
Wildl i fe Population Low High No action 
 
Water Qual i ty Improve 40%  Improve 10%  No change 
 
Pr ice 
$10.00 $50.00 $0.00 
Indicate which of the above options (A, B or C) would you prefer to have in the province of Saskatchewan: 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY 
                                                               Option A                  
                                                               Option B 
                                                               Option C                                                    
Source: Results of the present study 
 
4.3.2. Level of responsibility 
The attitudes of respondents for level of environmental responsibility were elicited through 
a series of questions evaluating the respondent perceptions on who should bear the costs of 
protecting wetlands on privately owned agricultural land in Saskatchewan. However, before 
measuring the perceived level of responsibility that landowners should bear to preserve wetlands, 
a question was posed to evaluate participants’  attitude  towards  wetland  government  policy.  This 
line of questioning was included to capture the perception of the researcher that participants’ 
attitude towards wetland policy could potentially be influenced by the credibility that 
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government has. A government with low credibility could influence participants interested in 
wetland conservation to choose options in which landowners have greater level of responsibility. 
In other words, one could argue that participants’  attitude  towards  wetland government policy 
could be biased if participants do not believe government is capable of providing the right 
incentives for protecting wetland through policy instruments. Thus, participants were asked to 
give their thoughts on government policy on wetlands in Saskatchewan. Participants were asked 
whether they believe public policy can help landowners to preserve wetlands, and whether 
government should allocate more money from their budget to improve natural areas and 
environmental quality. Similarly, they were presented the following two statements and asked 
whether they strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree.  
a) Landowner have the moral obligation to preserve wetlands on their lands; 
b) Society has the moral obligation to help landowners to preserve wetlands on their land. 
The statements above can provide important information about  participants’  perceived 
level of environmental responsibility, between society and landowners, of providing EG&S on 
privately owned land. Participants can then be grouped according to whether they agree or not 
with each statement. The responses to these questions can be related to demographic 
characteristics and compared to help identify heterogeneity in preferences. For example, using 
basic statistical methods (e.g. T-test),  it’s  possible  to  discern whether sample beliefs differ 
between groups of people with lower and higher income or education. Regarding whether society 
or landowners are perceived to have greater responsibility for wetland preservation costs, the 
results according to the demographic information can have an important impact on policy 
development,  since  it’s  possible  to  argue  that a particular group of people would be most affected 
by a specific policy change. For example, consider the hypothetical situation where only high 
income people believe government should allocate more money to wetland conservation policies. 
In such scenarios perhaps a progressive style environmental tax could be employed to increase 
the relative responsibility of this societal segment. 
To more fully evaluate the perception of participants on relative responsibility for EG&S 
conservation, participants were presented with a scenario where they are asked to choose the 
percentage of wetland preservation costs that landowners and society should be responsible for. 
Similarly, the results from this question can be compared based on the demographic data in order 
to capture differences in opinion related to specific demographic characteristics. An example can 
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be the potential difference in opinion between urban and rural population with regard to who 
should bear most of the conservation costs (landowners or society). The question was framed as 
follow: 
 “Suppose  it  is  found  that  it will  cost  a  landowner $100 per acre  to preserve a 3 acre 
wet land on their land.  When preserved this wet land can provide the full range of EG &S 
provided by any healthy wet land.  What proport ion of tha t $100 should the landowner be 
responsible for?  Choose a proport ion from the following 100 point scale where 100 
indicates the landowner should be responsible for all wet land preservat ion costs while 0 
indicates that society, through public conservat ion payments, would fully compensate the 
landowner for wetland preservation costs:” 
 
  
 
4.3.3. Demographic  information 
The last section of the survey focuses on collecting the relevant demographic information. 
This information is required to assess the quality of the data in term of representativeness of the 
sample population relative to the general population, as well as to use these data as explanatory 
variables to investigate heterogeneity in preferences. This section was composed of five 
questions (see appendix B),  designed  to  provide  important  information  about  participants’  socio-
economic characteristics. The descriptive statistics from this section were firstly compared with 
the 2006 Canadian census (results are presented in chapter 5, table 5.1), which has the objective 
of assessing the quality of the data acquired in the survey. Significant differences between census 
and the survey results could be a source of concern, since statistically similar results are the 
expected outcome from representative sample. Therefore, it is expected that the majority of the 
demographic information would not differ significantly from the census data. Once the 
demographic information from the whole sample is compared with census data, it is possible to 
use this socio-economic information within specific sub-groups for both the level of 
responsibility and the choice analysis (see how the demographic results were coded, compared 
and how descriptive statistics was conducted in the section 4.4). For example, considering the 
household income or education information that is collected in the survey, it is possible to 
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investigate if high income or educated participants present different attitude towards wetland 
conservation.  
Therefore, choosing which socio-economic information to be considered in the study is 
very important. The Canadian census can give important insights of types of variables that one 
could use. However, there is a trade-off between number of questions to be included in the 
survey and difficulty to acquire participants or quality of the data due the fatigue. Therefore, this 
study gives preference for a short and straight forward demographic section. The variables 
chosen in the demographic section for this study are commonly used in the vast majority of 
census and demographic sections of studies employing surveys.   
 
  
4.4.Delivering the survey 
 
The CE survey was conducted as a web-based survey. Prior to administering the survey it 
received approval from the ethics committee for human and behaviour research at University of 
Saskatchewan.  Participants voluntarily answered the survey questions which were hosted by the 
Itracks’  web  system  (www.itracks.com)17. A Web-based survey has a number of advantages over 
other methods of conducting surveys. Cobanoglu et al. (2001) found greater response rate and 
lower cost for web-based surveys when compared to mail and fax methods. Furthermore, web-
based survey facilitates relatively rapid data collection, can be widely applied and eliminate 
hand-coding since data is coded automatically (Cobanoglu, Warde, & Moreo, 2001). The sample 
size of the present survey was 250 participants, aged 18 years or older, sampled from 
Saskatchewan residents. 
Among the advantages of web-based surveys is the elimination of hand-coding since data 
is coded automatically. The data was mostly coded as  binary variables according to the interest 
of each analysis made in this thesis. For example, the answer for statement a) (section 4.3.2), 
                                                 
17 This company was hired to recruit participants and to host the survey on the web. The company was asked to 
respect the terms of the ethical approval (e.g. ensuring minimum age for participants, anonymously participants 
recruiting, etc.), which conditioned their hiring process. However, the company did not provided the response rate 
for this study. 
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people choosing agree or strongly agree were coded as 1 and all others coded as 0. Therefore, 
calculating the percentage of people agreeing (or strongly agreeing) that Landowner have the 
moral obligation to preserve wetlands on their lands, can be easily calculated. Descriptive 
statistics can also be provided from a binary series. For example, the percentage of the sample 
that agree or strongly agree with the statement a) can be obtained from a simple average of the 
binary for those that have chosen these options.  
All descriptive statistics developed for the present study were made using the Eviews 
econometric software. Eviews was also used to conduct simple hypothesis tests. Hypothesis tests 
were often used to statistically compare any multiple series of data. For example, in order to infer 
whether, the group of people agreeing and strongly agreeing with statement a (section 4.3.2) is 
different from the number of people disagreeing and strongly disagreeing, a hypothesis test was 
carried.  
Interactions of the demographic information with the questions from the choice experiment 
section of the survey (presented at 4.3.2) used a similar procedure. However, in this case, the 
binary variables were multiplied by the demographic information, therefore isolating the 
demographic information from the group of interest. For example, considering that the household 
income or education information is collected in the survey, it is possible to investigate if high 
income or educated participants present different attitudes towards wetland conservation. In 
order to infer whether people that believe landowners have the moral obligat ion to preserve 
wet lands on their lands (statement a, 4.3.2) higher levels of income than the average individual 
in the sample (the results of these examples can be found at section 5.3.1, page 68), the binary 
variable for agreeing and strongly agreeing with this statement (a) can be multiplied by the 
income series from the sample (which would isolate only the income of those participants that 
have chosen either agree or strongly agree options for statement a. Then, the simple hypothesis 
test can be carried in eviews with both the series resulting from this multiplication and the 
income from the whole sample. Eviews’  output will give the p-value from this test considering 
the hypothesis that both series statistically have the same average. All the data from the survey 
was coded as binary variables and analyzed according to the objectives of this study. The results 
from each series created, its interactions, and the descriptive statistics are presented in chapter 5 
along with their respective discussion.   
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4.5. Summary  of the chapter   
 
Agriculture has been traditionally important to Saskatchewan. However, agricultural 
development has also been associated with a range of environmental costs.  Evidence shows that 
the majority of wetland losses in the province have occurred within the agricultural landscape. 
To assess perceptions of this problem, this study developed a survey mechanism focused on 
agricultural land. A selection of EG&S that are provided by prairie wetlands were identified and 
a choice model was applied as the method to estimate values for these attributes. The perceived 
level of responsibility that landowners and society have towards conserving wetlands was also 
considered through a series of questions during the survey development. The survey was finally 
delivered using a web-based approach. The results from the methodology presented in this study 
are discussed in chapter 5. 
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5. CHAPTER – RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The previous two chapters have provided the theoretical and research background to 
EG&S evaluation within agricultural landscapes. The aim of this chapter is to establish the 
relevance of the theoretical model to the social preferences of Saskatchewan residents in order to 
provide important information on the value of EG&S for the development of appropriate 
policies.  The  chapter  analyzes  the  characteristics  of  Saskatchewan’s  society  and  geographical 
factors that may affect their participation choice. An investigation was also conducted to evaluate 
the perceived level of responsibility that landowners and society should bear in any wetland 
conservation initiatives, as well as social WTP for wetland attributes. This chapter begins with an 
explanation of the survey results providing a range of descriptive statistics. Following this two 
different econometric choice models were estimated  and  compared  to  evaluate  the  model’s 
robustness and goodness of fit with the survey data. A discussion of the empirical model results 
is presented in next section. Finally, the chapter ends with a summary. 
 
 
5.2. Survey results18 
 
Participants in Saskatchewan electronically completed a total of 250 surveys in June 2010. 
The survey was electronically hosted by the Itracks’  web  system  and  available  until  the 
completion of 250 surveys19. Personal and demographic information from the survey were 
                                                 
18 Due to nature of the choice set, it is not possible (to the present date) expres s the descriptive statistics for the 
attributes considered in the choice model. 
19 The company did not provided the response rate for this study 
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compared  with  equivalent  parameters  from  Saskatchewan’s  2006  Census  to  evaluate  whether  the 
sample population was representative of the provincial population (Table 5.1). Social and 
economic characteristics of the sample were mostly not significantly different from the 2006 
Census  for  Saskatchewan.  For  example,  average  adult  age  of  the  sample  doesn’t  differ 
statistically from the 2006 census (Statistics Canada, 2006a). The sample was arranged in the 
range of 18-60 years old for comparison with the census data. Consistent with the Saskatchewan 
population, most of the participants sampled were within the range 18-60 years old (73%). The 
overall average age of the sample is approximately 49 years old. The percentage of participants 
stating their nationality as Canadians was also not significantly different from the 2006 Census 
data. From the sample, 97% stated to have Canadian citizenship. Moreover, the percentage of 
participants with university or higher degree and the stated annual average income were not 
significantly different from 2006 Census (Statistics Canada, 2006a). However, the sample 
population had a lower representation of rural residents than the provincial population at the 5% 
significance level. This difference may be expected due to the fact that Internet access is higher 
in urban areas and in many rural areas that do have Internet access it is relatively slow 
technology making survey completion frustrating. Despite the difference in rural population, the 
sample population of this study may be considered representative of the Saskatchewan 
population, since all other demographic characteristics were similar to the 2006 Census for the 
province and the difference in rural population was not strong enough to be rejected at 1% 
significance level.  
To more effectively understand the influence of respondent characteristics on the responses 
the rural population was evaluated in isolation. Since there was statistical difference between the 
census and the sample results for rural residents (see  “rural populat ion”  in  table  5.1), social 
characteristics of both urban and rural resident characteristics were compared. Comparing these 
samples may help understanding the reasons for this difference. For example, if rural 
respondents  were  statistically  older  than  census’  rural  population,  it  may  indicate  that  age  was 
one factor influencing the number of responses in rural area. On the other hand, no statistical 
difference between the rural characteristics may indicate that despite the rural sample being 
smaller,  the  characteristics  within  the  sample  doesn’t  differ  from the census. In the case that the 
demographic characteristics of rural respondents are not significantly different from the census 
data, there may be an indication for greater confidence with the sample results. From the 250 
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participants, 71 stated that they were rural Saskatchewan residents. The average age of those 
participants was approximately 48 years old, which is not significantly different from the average 
age in rural Saskatchewan according to the census 2006 (table 5.2) (Statistics Canada, 2006b). 
The level of education on average was also similar to the census of 2006 for rural Saskatchewan 
(Statistics Canada, 2006b).  
 
Table  5.1. Soc ial and e conomic characte ristics of the  respondents (n=250).  
  
Sample  
Average (Std. Dev.)a 
Canada census (2006) - 
Saskatchewanb 
 
Between  18 - 29 years old 25.50% (33.42%) 25.68% 
Between  30 - 60 years old 51.79%(49.05%) 49.59% 
Over 60 years old 27.1% (44.5%) 24.70% 
Canadian Citizen 97.2% (16.5%) 96.80% 
Rural Population** 28.40% 35.00% 
Education (% with university 
degree and above) 32.7 (47.0%) 34.00% 
Income (Average – CAD$ 
annually) 44,761 (18,7601) 46,705 
Note : *** denote difference with s tatis tical s ignificance at 1%  leve l , ** denote 
s tatis tical s ignificance at 5%  leve l and * denote s tatis tical s ignificance at 10%  leve l ; 
a O r iginal data obtained from the survey of Sask atchewan soc i ety; bStatis tics Canada 
(2006b).  
Source: Results of the present study. 
 
Table  5.2. Soc ial and e conomic characte ris tics  of the  respondents  liv ing in 
rural Sask atchewan (n=71). 
  
Sample  
Average (Std. Dev.)a 
Canada census (2006) - 
Rural Saskatchewanb 
 Age (average) 48 (18.87) 52 
Canadian Citizen 95.8% (20.3%) - 
Average Education High School/Tech. Diploma 
High School/Tech 
Diploma 
Note : *** denote difference with s tatis tical s ignificance at 1%  leve l , ** denote 
s tatis tical s ignificance at 5%  leve l and * denote s tatis tical s ignificance at 10%  leve l ; 
a O r iginal data obtained from the survey of Sask atchewan soc iety; bStatis tics Canada 
(2006b).  
Source: Results of the present study. 
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5.3. Level of responsibility 
 
An important component in understanding the perceptions that society holds with respect 
to how the responsibility for wetland and EG&S conservation should be shared between 
landowners and society is their attitude towards wetland government policy. For example, if 
participants do not support government policies, one could argue that their attitudes on the level 
of responsibility between landowners and society could be biased, since the EG&Ss would be 
better provided when landowners bear the costs. In other words, a government that has a low 
level of credibility to the public could influence participants interested in wetland conservation to 
choose options in which landowners have greater level of responsibility. In fact, some surveyed 
participants that opt for landowners to manage wetland stated that there is no guarantee that the 
money would be properly spent if government becomes responsible for bearing the costs20. Thus, 
participants were asked whether they believe public policy can help landowners to preserve 
wetlands. The results indicate that 75% of the respondents believe public policy can help 
landowners to preserve wetlands on their land.  
After participants were asked about their attitudes toward public policy for wetlands the 
survey then focused on determining their beliefs on government budget allocation. Results 
indicated that the majority of the respondents (88%) agreed that government should allocate 
more money from their budget to improve natural areas and environmental quality in 
Saskatchewan. In other words, it seems that the majority of the sample population perceived that 
wetland conservation was not adequately represented in government priorities.  However, as 
discussed earlier (chapter 4) they were not provided with the actual provincial expenditures on 
wetland programs. This result represented an expression based on their perceptions of 
government budget allocations (see chapter 4). This position that governments should allocate 
more budget may be a response to the understanding that there has been 85% wetland loss since 
early 1800s in Canada. This finding is consistent with other recent research showing that the 
                                                 
20 The referred  statement is fully presented as follows.  “The discussion of dol lar values assumes the money would be 
properly spent .  There is no guarantee of tha t i f government gets too involved”. This participant opted for farmers  to 
fully bear the costs of wetland preservation.  
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public believes that the environment should receive greater attention from policy makers (e.g. 
Olewiler, 2007). Adamowicz (2007) argues that the depreciation of habitat is considered 
“signif icant by the Canadian public”.  Furthermore,  with  respect  to  the  competing  priorities  of 
governments, Adamowicz (2007) highlights the fact that the trade-off between maintaining the 
tax base and protecting natural capital, in addition to the desire to be re-elected, can lead 
governments to opt for conversion of natural capital to constructed capital, as follows (in 
Adamowicz, 2007).  
Governments “are  often  subject  to  pressure  from  developers  to  convert  lands,  and the 
deve lopments erected on these lands serve to improve the tax base . Protecting the na tural 
capital will not provide [the government] with tax revenues, and this can crea te political and 
economic difficulties for the community.”  
 
The behavioural characteristics of the sample population were further investigated by 
evaluating the frequency in which respondents participate on nature related activities in 
Saskatchewan. Hartig, Kaiser and Strumse (2007) argue that people may behave in 
environmentally friendly ways because they gain psychologically from their experiences in 
natural environments. Therefore, the present survey presented to respondents the option to 
choose one of the following categories of participation in nature related activities: a) never; b) 
less than once in a month; c) 1-3 times in a month, and; d) once a week or more. The number of 
participants that participated less than once in a month in outdoor activities in rural areas of 
Saskatchewan (40%) is statistically greater than the number of participants that stated that they 
participated 1 to 3 times per month of more (23%), which in turn is statistically smaller than the 
number of those that never participate (37%). Thus, approximately 63% of the sample population 
participated in outdoor activities in rural Saskatchewan.  
These findings are fairly consistent with Jackson (2006), who found that nearly three-
quarters of Canadians indicated great or some interest in participating in outdoor activities in 
natural areas, such as camping, picnicking, hiking, riding, cycling, skiing, snowshoeing, off-road 
vehicle use, swimming or boating. Regionally, when asked about the participation on 
recreational services (such as hunting and fishing) Saskatchewan is the province with the highest 
percentage of households reporting participation (Statistic Canada, 2006). Weaver (1997) and 
SES (2009) have highlighted the potential for and growth of outdoor activities in rural areas of 
Saskatchewan. According to a 1991 survey, 19% of Canadians took vacations to engage in non-
consumptive wildlife-related pursuits, such as watching or studying wildlife, photography, and 
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hiking. In addition, many studies show that tourists are willing to pay to experience these natural 
areas by spending approximately 2.4 billion dollars per year in Canada and 8.5% more for 
services and products that are provided by environmentally responsible suppliers (SES, 2009). 
According to Weaver (1997), the Saskatchewan prairies provide a variety of opportunities for 
ecotourism industry, with special interest for bird watching, where wetlands play a significant 
role. Moreover, a 1996 Environment Canada survey found that an estimated of 9 million 
Canadians (38% of the population) participated in residential wildlife-related activities and 4.4 
million Canadians (18.6% of the population) participated in wildlife viewing in Canada 
(Environment Canada 1999, pg.11). 
Respondents were also asked how often they participate in nature-related activities in non-
rural areas of Saskatchewan, which would include urban parks. The results indicate that there are 
significantly more people participating in nature-related activities (stating options other than 
‘never’)  in  non-rural areas (70%) than rural areas (at 10% significance level). This is an expected 
result since the majority of the sample population was located in urban areas (Table 5.1). 
Therefore, one may expect that, simply due to the relatively lower cost of access (e.g. travel 
time, gas consumption) the percentage of participants using urban facilities for nature-related 
activities would be higher.  As a point of comparison respondents from rural areas were less 
likely (at 5% significance level) to participate in nature related activities in urban areas with 30% 
of participants indicating that they ‘never’  participate  urban  area;  and  29%  chosen the options 1-
3 times in a month or more (see table 5.3).  
It should be noted that the majority of those that do not often participate in nature-related 
activities 21% of the total sample would use neither rural nor non-rural areas. On the other hand, 
11% of the respondents often participate in both rural and non-rural nature related activities 
(table 5.3). Overall, the results on table 5.3 show the participants behaviour towards outdoor 
nature-related activities, which is supported by other studies that highlight the potential of 
recreational outdoor activities and ecotourism (e.g. Jackson, 2006; DSE, 2008; Statistics Canada, 
2006a).  
 
 
 
 
68 
Table  5.3. Nature  re lated activ ities  dis tribution.  
On average, how 
often do you 
participate in nature 
related activities 
Rural  
Average (Std. Dev.)a 
Non-rural  
Average (Std. Dev.)a 
Both  
Average (Std. Dev.)a 
   Never (%) 37.0 (48.4)** 30.3 (46.0)** 20.7 (40.6)*** 
Less than once a 
month (%) 40.2 (49.1) 40.2 (40.1) 19.5 (39.7)*** 
1-3 times or more in 
a month (%) 22.7 (42.0)** 29.5 (45.7)** 10.8 (31.0)*** 
Note : *** denote difference with s tatis tical s ignificance at 1%  leve l , ** denote s tatis tical s ignificance at 
5%  leve l and * denote s tatis tical s ignificance at 10%  leve l ; a O r iginal data obtained from the survey of 
Sask atchewan soc iety.  
Source: Results of the present study. 
 
5.3.1. Public  preferences for management  responsibilities 
To better understand public preferences for policy aimed at providing EG&S the 
participants’ opinions on the relative responsibility of landowners and society with respect to 
wetland conservation were assessed. First, they were presented the following two statements and 
asked whether they strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree.  
 
a) Landowners have the moral obligation to preserve wetlands on their lands; 
b) Society has the moral obligation to help landowners to preserve wetlands on their land. 
 
For both statements, the number of respondents that agreed and strongly agreed were 
significantly higher at the 1% level of significance (see Figure 5.1 and 5.2). In the case of the 
statement that landowners have a moral obligation, 87% of the participants either agreed or 
strongly agreed, with less than 13% of the respondents disagreeing with the statement. 
Interestingly, approximately 81% of the sample also agreed or strongly agreed that society has 
the moral obligation to help landowners to preserve wetland on their land. At first, these findings 
may seem to be contradictory; however, a carefully assessment suggest that respondents appear 
to be supportive of some level of shared cost. The respondents believe that the primary holder of 
the wetland property rights has an obligation to maintain those wetlands but that the beneficiaries 
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of a number of the EG&S that flow from those protected wetlands, namely the broader society, 
has a responsibility to shoulder some of the costs of conservation, even if the conservation occurs 
on private land. Furthermore, approximately 76% of the participants agreed or strongly agreed 
with both statements. Participants may prefer a shared cost structure due to the complexity of the 
goods and services being provided by wetlands since it can represent benefits to both, society 
and landowners (National Wetlands Working Group, 1988). One concern over the results of the 
survey may be that the significant difference between the statements a) and b) (87-81= 6%) is 
coming from the lower concentration of rural population in the sample (demographic difference 
between 2006 Census and sample data - table 5.1). If that was the case, there could be an 
indication that the results are biased21. To test this hypothesis, the rural population was isolated 
and both statements (a and b) were compared with the results for the whole sample. The 
percentage of rural population that agreed and strongly agreed with statements a) and b) (83% 
and 76%, respectively) does not statistically differ from the whole sample at the 5% significance 
level. Therefore, similar to the whole sample, there are more people agreeing and strongly 
agreeing with statement a) than statement b) in the rural population which indicates that the 
results are not biased in this way. Therefore, even considering a sample with more landowners, 
the number of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with statements a) and b) is not 
expected to differ from the presented results. 
From the perspective of the policy maker, the perceived share of responsibility is very 
important. Indeed, policies implicitly determine the level of responsibility that landowners and 
society have over wetland. For example, a regulatory policy may transfer to landowners specific 
obligations that impose preservation costs (Claassen, et al., 2001). On the other hand, a financial 
payment instrument may transfer to the landowners the flexibility of choosing what percentage 
of the costs they may wish to bear (DSE, 2008), but since the sample population agreed that both 
landowners and society (through public policy) have responsibilities, questions about the 
perception of the distribution of this shared cost naturally arise.  Note that despite agreeing that 
both landowners and society have moral obligations towards EG&S conservation, little is known 
about how this responsibility is shared. For example, how should the costs of protecting wetlands 
                                                 
21 This hypothesis assumes that the sample with fewer landowners wouldn’t have power enough to push the results 
towards greater society responsibility - considering they would present a more selfish behavior. In this case, it would 
be considered se lect ion bias (or selection effect), in which all participants are not equally balanced or objectively 
represented.  
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be shared, between the landowner and the broader public, according to social perceptions? For 
example, landowners may agree that they have responsibilities over EG&S provision, but they 
may also argue that their level of responsibility is low and public policy should bear most of the 
costs.  
 
F igure  5.1.  Respondents  perception  of  landowners’  moral 
obligation to prese rve  we tlands  on the ir land.  
Source: Results of the present study. 
 
 
 
 
 
F igure  5.2. Respondents perception of society’s moral obligation to 
he lp landowne rs  to prese rve  we tlands  on the ir land.  
3.98  1.99 
6.77 
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obligation to preserve wetlands on their land (%) 
Not Apply
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree
2.39  3.19 
13.55 
48.61 
32.27 
Respondents perception of society's moral obligation to 
help landowners to preserve wetlands on their land (%) 
Not Apply
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree
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Source: Results of the present study. 
 
In an attempt to more completely understand the level of sharing of responsibility and 
conservation costs between landowners and society, participants were asked to choose the 
percentage of costs that landowners should be responsible for, assuming that the rest would be 
supported by society through public policy (Figure 5.3). Within this sharing structure a response 
of 0% means society would be fully responsible for the costs to protect wetlands through public 
policy instruments, and a response of 100% means that landowners would fully bear the costs of 
wetland preservation. The most frequent response (30% of respondents) was a 50-50% share, 
which means that approximately one third of the participants agree that society (through public 
policy) and landowners should equally split the costs of protecting wetlands on privately owned 
land (Figure 5.3). This result is significantly (at 1% significance level) higher than any other 
share. To better understand the implications for policy of this result the characteristics of the 
individuals that chose this equal share alternative where isolated.  The average age of these 
participants is less than the sample average (significant at 1%) suggesting that age influences 
respondents’  choice  for  equal sharing of the conservation costs, such that younger respondents 
are more likely to choose 50-50% share. In contrast,  the  level  of  education  and  income  doesn’t 
statistically differ from the total sample results (table 5.4). In short, respondents that preferred 
50-50% share are younger, with average education and income (compared to the whole sample 
data).   
Respondents can also be distinguished in the group in which society was felt to be 
responsible for a greater share (0%-40% share for landowners) and the group in which 
landowners have greater share (60-100%). Considering these groups, the majority of the sample 
was distributed within the group of people believing society should be responsible for a greater 
share (50.6% of the respondents). In other words, most participants prefer the cost sharing 
structure in which society bears over 50% of the conservation costs. Interestingly, most of the 
participants in the sample are from urban areas of Saskatchewan, which may be an indication 
that (participants believe) society should bear a greater level of responsibility over EG&S 
provision through public policy than landowners. While the survey responses were not 
specifically developed to determine the range of reasons participants had for choosing the level 
of responsibility for the provision of environmental services some of the potential reasons are 
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implied by responses given by respondents to the open ended question.  For example the 
following perceptions were provided that may form the foundation for the level of responsibility 
reported: i) the belief that public policy may not be efficiently helping landowners; ii) 
landowners cannot have additional costs added to their costs structure:  “farming is not a 
lucrative  business  to  be  in”,  and iii) the nature of the good being provided (public). Furthermore, 
compared with the averages from the sample population, the group of participants who feel that 
society should shoulder a greater share of the costs for conservation  (0-40% share) represented 
higher annual income (average annual income of 47,047 - significantly different from the sample 
average at 10%) and greater education university degree or above (38.78%, significant at 5%). 
However, respondent age did not statistically differ from the total sample average age. These 
results suggest that wealthier and more educated people would likely prefer policy measures that 
distribute the level of responsibility of wetland conservation towards society. Considering these 
results together, over 80% of the participants felt that society should be responsible for 50% or 
more of the conservation costs.  
The group of participants that felt that landowners should bear most of the conservation 
costs was significantly smaller (19% of the sample). This group of people presented average age 
but had an annual income that was smaller than the sample average (46 years old and 41,326, 
respectively - both significantly different at 1%). This result may be an indication that lower 
income people are less willing to see their money expended on wetland conservation. Such 
suggestion could be supported by some of the reasons participants gave for lower societal 
responsibility for the costs in the open ended question (e.g.  “farm is a business (...) and 
businesses have to reduce a bit of prof it to accommodate environmental”). However, identifying 
the reasons people had to choose the sharing costs structure is beyond the scope of this study.        
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F igure  5.3. Pe rce ived sharing respons ibility scenario  
Source: Results of the present study. 
 
As indicated earlier, the respondents stated a preference for the option to share equally the 
responsibility for wetland conservation with approximately 30% of all respondents choosing this 
option. This result may be subject to a level of bias with the respondents not having well-
developed preferences and choosing the easiest option to justify. In addition, if the majority of 
people preferred 50-50% share, one would expect a normal distribution of the preferred 
proportion of sharing centered on 50-50. The normal distribution was tested (details of the 
testing methods included in Chapter 4); however, the hypothesis of normal distribution was 
rejected. Indeed, the majority of the respondents (51%) chose societal responsibility while only 
20%  chose  landowners’  responsibility. Rural residents presented similar behaviour: 33% of the 
rural residents opted for 50-50 sharing cost; 53% chose societal responsibility and 14% of rural 
respondents felt that landowners’  should be responsible.  
Despite the above discussed concerns, overall the results were deemed to be a satisfactory 
representation of population perspectives and appeared to be in agreement with the related 
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literature. A negative correlation was found between age, education and income and the 
preferred level of responsibility for landowners. Thus, on average, older, more educated and 
wealthier participants prefer a greater level of responsibility for society. The significant 
difference between  the  three  share  groups’  variables  (age  and  income)  and  the  sample  averages 
may indicate that different social levels may have different preferences with respect to the 
environment and EG&S in Saskatchewan.   
 
Table  5.4.  Soc ial and e conomic characte ris tics  of the  respondents  within pe rce ived shared 
cos t groups   
  
Lower 
landowner 
responsibility 
(0-40% share) 
Equal 
Sharing 
(50-50% share) 
Greater 
landowner 
responsibility 
(60-100% share)  
Total 
Sample 
Age 50.4 46.4*** 45.9*** 49.3 
Education (% 
with university 
degree and above) 
38.8%** 32.0% 30.7% 32.7% 
Income 47,047* 43,133 41,326*** 44,761 
Source: Results of the present study. 
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5.4. Valuation  of wetland  EG&S   
 
As discussed in chapter 3, the CE was designed based on the assumption that the 
observable utility function would follow a strictly additive form. The model was specified so that 
the probability of selecting a particular wetland management scenario was a function of 
attributes of that scenario and of the alternative specific constant (ASC – see chapter 4), which 
was specified to equal 1 when either management scenario A or B was selected, and to 0 when 
the  ‘neither  management  scenario’  option  was  selected.  Using  the  2250  choices  elicited  from  250 
respondents, two basic conditional logit (CL) models (McFadden, 1974; Greene, 1997 pp. 913–
914; Maddala, 1999, pp. 42) with logarithmic and linear specifications for the attributes at three 
levels were estimated and compared using the LIMDEP/NLOGIT statistical software. The 
highest value of the log-likelihood function was found for the specification with both three-
levelled attributes in linear form (reported in Table 5.5). Thus, the logarithmic specification was 
not considered a good fit and only the results from the linear specification are relevant for (and 
used in) this study (e.g. Birol, Karousakis, & Koundouri, 2006). In addition, the model was 
specified considering both the total number of participants and including only those participants 
who indicated they were sure about their responses (using cut off 4 – see section 4.3.1) and the 
results of these two analyses were compared. However, no statistical differences were found in 
the coefficients considering the results from the follow up certainty question. In other words, the 
number of participants unsure about their choices wasn’t large enough to significantly affect the 
results. For this reason, only the whole sample was considered in this analysis. The results from 
the CL model22 are reported in the first column of Table 5.5. The coefficients for CL model are 
highly significant, at 1% level of confidence, and all the signs are as expected a priori according 
to utility theory.  
The analysis of the survey results indicates that the respondents felt that all of the wetland 
attributes are significant, and ceteris paribus, higher levels of any single attribute increases the 
probability that a management scenario is selected. In other words, respondents prefer scenarios 
that result in higher levels of riparian area, wildlife population and water quality. The negative 
sign on the payment coefficient indicates that higher payment levels decrease the utility of 
                                                 
22 From this point further CL model will only refer to the linear specification. 
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selecting that choice set. The negative sign of the payment coefficient also can be interpreted  
that higher levels of payment would reduce the probability that a management scenario is 
selected, ceteris paribus, which is expected (Do & Bennett, 2007). However, the interpretation of 
the coefficient values is not straightforward (except for the significance and relative size).  
For further interpretation of the coefficients it is necessary to calculate the marginal rates 
of substitution between the attributes using the coefficient for cost as numeraire, which is 
considered as average marginal WTP. Overall, these results indicate that positive and significant 
economic values exist for higher levels of ecological attributes of the wetland. The positive and 
significant sign on the ASC coefficient implies that a positive utility impact occurs in any move 
away from the status quo. In other words, any improvement made on the current levels of 
wetland conservation is preferred by participants holding other variables constant. This result is 
also expected, since it indicates that participants care about EG&S provided by wetlands and 
improvements are welcome, ceteris paribus. Indeed, the positive correlation between the 
movement away from the status quo and the increase in utility is not uncommon in wetland 
valuation studies. Examples of preference for wetland management scenarios over status quo 
include, Do and Bennett (2007) estimating wetland biodiversity values in Vietnam’s Mekong 
River Delta found positive ASC coefficient; Whitten and Bennett (2005) found similar results in 
southern Australia and Birol et al. (2006) in Cheimaditida, Greece. 
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Table  5.5. C L , RPL and RPL with inte ractions  es timates  for we tland management attributes23. 
 
  
                                                 
23 Due to nature of the choice set, it is not possible (to the present date) express the descriptive statistics for the 
attributes considered in the choice model.  
Attributes   C L RPL   
RPL mode l with 
inte ractions  
 Coe f. (s .e .) Coe f. (s .e .) Coe f. Std. (s .e .) Coe f. (s .e .)  
A lte rnative  Spec ific 
Cons tant (ASC) 
1.70880*** 
(0.0855) 
0.01324*** 
(0.0458) 
0.3275*** 
(0.0337) 
-0.23294 
(0.1760) 
Riparian are a 0.23500*** (0.0334) 
0.21363*** 
(0.0381) 
0.07046* 
(0.0390) 
0.34718*** 
(0.0408) 
Wildlife  Population 0.38186*** (0.0386) 
0.30236*** 
(0.0394) 
0.07364* 
(0.0399) 
0.15527*** 
(0.0422) 
Wate r Q uality 0.63839*** (0.0414) 
0.57080*** 
(0.0424) 
0.12993*** 
(0.0434) 
0.32134*** 
(0.0484) 
Payment 
-0.00355*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.00169*** 
(0.0002)  
-0.00212*** 
(0.0002) 
R A*Age  
    
-0.00065 
(0.0029) 
WP*Age  
 
   0.00572** (0.0028) 
WQ*Age  
 
   -0.01709*** (0.0029) 
R A*Education 
    
-0.05309 
(0.0464) 
WP*Education 
    
0.16165*** 
(0.0443) 
WQ*Education 
 
   -0.33038*** (0.0508) 
R A*Income  
 
   -0.00349 (0.0137) 
WP*Income  
 
   -0.01063 (0.0132) 
WQ*Income  
    
0.01419 
(0.0152) 
Log like lihood -1904.250 -4142.15  -3496.15 
A I C 1.82093 1.31844  1.11593 
B I C 1.83440 1.32380  1.13094 
Note : *** denote s tatis tical s ignificance at 1%  leve l , ** denote s tatis tical s ignificance at 5%  leve l and * denote 
s tatis tical s ignificance at 10%  leve l .  
Source: Results of the present study. 
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The CL model assumes the independence of irrelevant alternatives24 (IIA) property, which 
states that the relative probabilities of two options being chosen are unaffected by introduction or 
removal of other alternatives. If the IIA property is violated then CL results will be biased and 
hence a discrete choice model that does not require the IIA property, such as random parameter 
logit (RPL) model, should be used. To test whether the CL model is appropriate, the Hausman 
and McFadden (1984) test for the IIA property is employed (see details in chapter 3 and 
Appendix C)25. The procedure is, first, to estimate the model with all choices. The alternative 
specification is the model with a smaller set of choices. Thus, the model is estimated with this 
restricted set of alternatives and the same model specification. The set of observations is reduced 
to those in which one of the smaller set of choices is made. In order to compute the coefficients 
in the restricted model, it is necessary to drop those observations that choose the omitted 
choice(s) (Greene, 2002). The results of the test are shown in Table 5.6 (below). As a result, in 
this test, Scenario A, B and C consider 1, 2 and 3 alternatives as restricted model, respectively. 
Therefore, observations choosing 1, 2 and 3 alternatives are marked as bad data and excluded in 
scenarios A, B and C, respectively. The Hausman statistic is used to carry out the test. In the 
preceding example, the large value suggests that the IIA restriction should be rejected (Greene, 
2002). The large Chi-Squared value also suggests that IIA restriction should be rejected26. 
Rejecting IIA allows the use of a more flexible model with a the RPL (Louviere, Hensher, & 
Swait, 2000). That is, on the basis of the Hausman-McFadden test the constant variance 
assumption has been violated and a less restrictive specification of the choice model needs to be 
considered. Therefore, the RPL model is appropriate for estimation of this data. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Detailed explanation of IIA and the Hausman-McFadden test can be found at Appendix C. 
25 The Hausman-McFadden IIA test was also executed using LIMDEP 8.0 NLOGIT 3.0.   
26 Hausman and McFadden (1984) provide a table for the cumulative distribution function of the test statistics, 
which is used by LIMDEP 8.0 NLOGIT 3.0 to calculate the probability value presented in table 5.6. Such procedure 
resulted in probability values extremely low (<0.05), suggesting that the restricted model is likely different from the 
non-restricted. In other words, the relative probabilities of two options being chosen are likely affected by the 
introduction or removal of other alternatives. 
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  Table  5.6. Test of Independence of irre le vant alte rnatives. 
A lte rnative  
dropped 
ChiSqrd Probability 
Scenario A  33.48 .000003 
Scenario B  57.55 .000000 
Scenario C  17.54 .000546 
Source: Results of the present study. 
 
 
5.5. Accounting  for heterogeneity in wetland  attribute  valuation   
 
Within the CL model, homogeneous preferences are assumed across all respondents. 
Preferences are in fact heterogeneous and accounting for this heterogeneity enables estimation of 
unbiased estimates of individual preferences and enhances the accuracy and reliability of 
estimates of demand, participation, marginal and total welfare (Greene, 1997). Furthermore, 
accounting for heterogeneity enables prescription of policies that take equity concerns into 
account. An understanding of who will be affected by a policy change in addition to 
understanding the aggregate economic value associated with such changes is necessary (Boxall 
& Adamowicz, 2002). The random parameter logit (RPL) model (Train, 1998), which accounts 
for unobserved, unconditional heterogeneity, such as the wetland studied in this CE, should be 
used in order to account for preference heterogeneity in pure public goods (Kontoleon, 2003).  
Recent research has shown that applications of the RPL model are superior to the CL 
model in terms of overall fit and welfare estimates (Layton & Brown, 2000; Carlsson et al., 
2003; Kontoleon, 2003; Lusk et al., 2003; Morey & Rossmann, 2003; Birol, Karousakis, & 
Koundouri, 2006).  
Thus, the RPL model is estimated using LIMDEP/NLOGIT software. All the parameters 
except the payment attribute were specified to be normally distributed (Train, 1998; Morey & 
Rossmann, 2003; Carlsson, Frykblom, & Liljenstolpe, 2003; Birol et al., 2006). The results of 
the RPL estimations are reported in the second column of Table 5.5. The coefficients obtained by 
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the RPL model are similar to the CL model. All of the wetland EG&S attributes are significant 
factors in the choice of a wetland management scenario, and ceteris paribus, higher levels of any 
single EG&S attribute increases the probability that a management scenario is selected. The 
payment variable is negative, indicating that higher payment levels decrease the utility of 
selecting that choice set. Finally, the null hypothesis that the parameters of the regression are 
equal is rejected by the log-likelihood ratio test (at 0.5%), which suggests that RPL is appropriate 
for analysis of the data set.  
Allowing parameter to randomly vary over individuals, RPL accounts for heterogeneity in 
the choice. However, this model fails to explain the sources of heterogeneity (Boxall and 
Adamowicz, 2002). Birol et al. (2006) suggest that sources of heterogeneity can be detected by 
including socio-demographic interactions with choice specific attributes and/or with ASC in the 
utility function. Such procedure would enables the RPL model to pick up preference variation in 
terms of both unconditional taste heterogeneity (random heterogeneity) and individual 
characteristics (conditional heterogeneity), and hence improve model fit (Birol et al., 2006). 
Many models are possible to be considered from the interaction of socio-demographic 
information and attributes choices. The model presented in the Table 5.5 is a result of extensive 
testing of the various interaction possibilities. Thus, the model that includes education, income 
and age was found to provide the best fit to the data. This model also has a better overall fit 
compared to the RPL model based on results from the log-likelihood (LL = -3496.15, which 
represent an improvement from RPL model without interaction, LL= -4142.15). To test if the 
regression parameters of these models are in fact equal, the log-likelihood ratio test was 
implemented (Greene, 2002). As expected, this test enables the rejection of null hypothesis that 
the regression parameters for the RPL model and the RPL model with interactions are equal at 
0.5% significance level, suggesting that improvement in the model fit is, in fact, achieved with 
the inclusion of social and economic characteristics.  
Similar to the model with no interactions, the coefficients for riparian area, wildlife 
population, water quality and payment remained significant and with the expected signs. 
Therefore, higher levels of any single EG&S attribute increases the probability that a 
management scenario is selected. Also similar to the model with no interaction, the payment 
variable is negative, indicating that higher payment levels decrease the utility of selecting that 
choice set. However, ASC presented negative sign, indicating that positive utility impact exists 
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in any movement towards status quo. Nevertheless, the coefficient is not significant. The 
interactions between age, education and wildlife population are positive. Confirming the results 
of several environmental valuation studies (Birol, Karousakis, & Koundouri, 2006; Do & 
Bennett, 2007), those respondents with higher levels of education are likely to prefer wetland 
management scenarios that provide higher levels of wildlife population. The interaction of 
riparian area and age, education and income was not significant, thus; these population features 
are likely to have little effect on riparian area conservation choice27. Similarly, the interaction 
between the income and wetland attributes is insignificant, suggesting that wetland attribute 
choice  is unaffected  by respondents’  income, similar to Birol, et al. (2006).  
 
 
5.6. Estimation  of willingness  to pay 
 
The CE method is consistent with utility maximisation and demand theory (Bateman, et al., 
2003). When the parameter estimates are obtained by the use of the appropriate model, welfare 
measures, in the form of marginal willingness to pay (WTP), can be determined by estimating 
the marginal rate of substitution between the change in the wetland management attribute in 
question and the marginal utility of income represented by the coefficient of the payment 
attribute.  
The implicit prices, or marginal WTP values, for each of the wetland management 
attributes was estimated using the Wald procedure (Delta method) in LIMDEP/ NLOGIT (Table 
5.8). For comparisons, estimates were calculated using CE and RPL models (Greene, 2002). T-
tests of WTP estimates of each attribute reveal that the WTP estimates from the models differ 
significantly at 1% significance level or less (except for the WTP for the Riparian area attribute 
from the CLM and RPL models, differ at 5% significance level). The numbers expressed in 
Table 5.8 represent the amount that a household would be willing to pay, in a one-time payment, 
for 1 level increase in the attributes. Thus, societal WTP (RPL) for increasing riparian area from 
                                                 
27 The result from the interaction between income and the attributes would, more likely , be expected to have 
stronger influence on level of attributes. The argument is that people with less income would be less willing to pay 
for EG&S than people with higher income, but that is not what suggest the results of this study. 
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5 to 10 meters is estimated at CAD$ 64.73; for wildlife population level28 increase, society is 
willing to pay CAD$ 57.56, and; for water quality, society WTP for decreasing the frequency of 
boil water advisories  is CAD$ 104.68. However, the comparison with these values needs to 
consider the details of the location in which the study took place, since the range of wetland 
prices (values) in the literature can vary from US$.15 per hectare ($ 0.06 per acre)  to US$54,485 
per hectare ($ 22,050 per acre)29 (Brander, Florax, & Vermaat, 2006). Considering a more local 
range, table 5.7 presents estimated values for restoring natural areas in some area of Canada.  
 
Table  5.7. Es timated values  of E G&Ss  provided by we tland 
 Descr iption Value Location 
WTP  fish and wildlife habitat by non-users $267 - $453/person/yr Alberta 
WTP freshwater fishing $97/person/yr Lake St.Clair 
WTP hunting and fishing $400 /person/yr Alberta 
Cost Water Quality - removing phosphorus $21.85 - $61.20/kg Vancouver’s primary  and secondary waste treatment plants 
Cost Water Quality - removing nitrogen $3.04 - $8.50/kg Vancouver’s primary  and secondary waste treatment plants  
Net Value conserving or restoring natural areas $195/ha/yr Grand River Watershed of Ontario 
Net Value conserving or restoring natural areas 
$65/ha/yr 
Upper Assiniboine River Basin in 
eastern Saskatchewan and western 
Manitoba 
Net Value conserving or restoring natural areas $126/ha/yr Mill River Watershed in P.E.I. 
Net Value Recreational Benefits - wildlife viewing $53.45/ha/yr Fraser River Valley, BC 
Net Value Flood protection from wetlands $408 - $2,110/ha/yr Fraser River Valley, BC 
Net Value Hunting and fishing $36/ha/yr Fraser River Valley, BC 
Net Value All EG&Ss provided by wetlands $5,792 - $24,330 /ha/yr Fraser River Valley, BC 
Source: Adapted from Olewiler (2004).  
 
The results from the present study put Saskatchewan in context with table 5.7. In other 
worlds, Saskatchewan residents seem to be within the range of values for wetland EG&S 
provision observed in other  studies  across  Canada.  Nevertheless,  this  study’s  results  provide 
important implications for EG&S and wetland policy development. The fact that water quality 
improvements had the greatest WTP in both models is a strong indication that participants 
recognise greater value in improvements in water quality. From a policy perspective, providing 
incentives to farmers to provide water quality on their wetlands will have more appeal to society 
and,  it’s  likely to be a better option. According to the graphical framework presented in section 
                                                 
28 For a complete description of the wildlife population and water quality levels please see section 4.4.1. 
29 In a meta-analysis of wetland valuation studies, Brander, Florax and Vermaat (2006) found that these studies are 
diverse in terms of values estimated. In fact, they found that of 33 wetland valuation studies done over 26 years the  
values per acre has ranged from US$ 0.06 to US$ 22,050 (Brander, Florax, & Vermaat, 2006). 
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3.2, it is possible to conclude that the externality associated with wetland changes that negatively 
impact water quality is greater than the other attributes. Thus, to provide society with the 
necessary amount to shift their marginal benefits to socially optimal levels of water quality, it is 
necessary more money (according to the formula presented earlier, MBps = MBpp + externalities) 
than the other attributes. Despite the fact that calculating the precise curve for the marginal 
benefits provided by wetland (or wetland attributes) is beyond the scope of this study, it is 
possible to precisely measure the amount needed to shift the current marginal benefit curve to the 
optimal. These are the amounts presented in the table below. 
 Based on survey data the social value of water quality is expected to be higher than the 
others attributes. The provision of clean water is an issue of worldwide importance and the role 
of wetlands in providing water quality is increasingly recognized by society and policy makers. 
Other wetland studies also presented water quality as one of the main concerns of society (e.g. 
Huel, 2000). However, the different models used in the present research provided different 
rankings for wildlife population and riparian area as EG&S attributes of wetlands. According to 
the characteristics of the model (see section 3.4), it could be possible that the unobserved factor 
from participants choosing riparian area is lightly correlated to wildlife habitat. For example, it 
could be possible that some participant have identified riparian area as a condition to increase in 
wildlife population. In this case, the RPL would be more appropriate (more detail about 
correlation in error term can be found at section 3.4.2). If the error terms from wildlife 
population are correlated to riparian area, only the RPL would capture this relationship.  
 
 
Table  5.8. M arginal WTP for we tland management 
attributes  (one -time payment, C A D/household/le ve l 
inc re ase ) and 95% C . I . 
A ttributes   C L M  (C A D)  
RPL 
(C A D)  
Riparian are a**  66.11  64.73  
Wildlife  
Population***  107.42  57.56  
Wate r Q uality***  179.59  104.68  
Note : T-tes t show s ignificant differences among the 
mode ls (*) at 10%  s ignificance leve l ; (**) at 5%  
s ignificance, and (***) at 1%  s ignificance leve l .  
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The implicit prices reported in Table 5.8 do not provide estimates of compensating surplus 
(CS) for the alternative management scenarios. In order to estimate the respondents' CS for 
improvements in wetland management over the status quo, three possible options were created. 
•  Current  scenario  — Perceived current levels of Riparian area, wildlife population and 
water quality. 
•  Scenario  1  — Low impact management scenario: Riparian area of 10 metre; wildlife 
population increased by 5%; water quality remain the same. 
•  Scenario  2— Medium impact management scenario: Riparian area of 20 m; wildlife 
population increased 10%; water quality remain the same. 
•  Scenario  3  — High impact management scenario: Riparian area of 20 m; wildlife 
population increased 20%; water quality improved 40%. 
To find the CS associated with each of the above scenarios the difference between the 
welfare measures under the status quo and the three management scenarios are calculated. Note 
that in order to estimate overall WTP for wetland management it is necessary to include the 
ASC, which captures the systematic but unobserved information about respondents' choices. The 
estimates of WTP for the three scenarios are reported in  Table 5.9 below. For comparisons, CS 
estimates are calculated for all models. The numbers expressed on table 5.9 represent the amount 
that  society should be compensated for a decrease in wetland management scenario in order to 
maintain indifference. In other words, society WTP (RPL) for scenario 1 is CAD$ 15.52; for up-
grading from scenario 1 to scenario 2, society is willing to pay CAD$ 25.15 more (40.67), and; 
for moving from status quo to scenario 3, society WTP is CAD$ 134.57. 
 
 Table  5.9. Compensating Surplus  for e ach scenario (C A D/respondent).  
Scenario C L M  RPL 
Scenario 1 24.15 15.52 
Scenario 2 63.28 40.67 
Scenario 3 209.36 134.57 
Source: Results of the present study. 
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As expected, the CS for the change from the status quo to the scenarios considered 
increases as we move towards improved ecological conditions in the wetland. For the CLM the 
mean WTP for the Low impact scenario is CAD$ 24.15, whereas greater improvements in 
ecological conditions in the wetland under the Medium impact scenario increase mean WTP to 
CAD $63.28, and under the High impact scenario to as high as CAD $209.36. 
Note that the difference between scenario 1 and 2 (RPL $25; CLM $39) is smaller than the 
difference between 2 and 3 (RPL $96; CLM $146). Comparing the specification for each 
scenario and the WTP for attributes (table 5.8),  it’s  possible  to  conclude  that  much  of  this 
difference reflects the greater concern that participants had with wildlife population and water 
quality. Thus, the results from this study suggest that when considering wetland preservation in 
Saskatchewan agricultural areas, participants would most likely prefer policies that provide water 
quality. Similarly, Laporte, Weersink and Yang (2010) highlight the importance of meeting 
water quality objectives for conservation policies in Ontario.  
 
 
5.7. Summary   
 
The demographic characteristics of the sample population were statistically insignificant 
from the general population, as represented in Census information from 2006 with the only 
exception being the rural population, which was further assessed. Overall, the comparison of 
sample results with the Census information indicated that the demographic characteristics of the 
sample population was consistent with the general population. Following the analysis of 
demographic information, the perceived level of responsibility that participants had towards the 
environmental costs of protecting EG&Ss provided by wetlands in agricultural areas of 
Saskatchewan was assessed. The results showed that the perceived level of responsibility was 
significantly higher for a sharing structure that consider 50-50 of the preservation costs being 
split between landowners and society. Other than equally splitting the costs, participants 
preferred costs structure that had society having greater responsibilities than farmers. In addition, 
these results were interacted with the demographic information in order to find heterogeneity in 
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behaviour. For instance, the education level and income of the participants that opted for levels 
of responsibilities towards society were found to significantly higher than the total sample. 
Finally, the results from the Choice Model were presented. From the attributes, water quality 
presented the highest WTP. Therefore, it is considered the most important attribute to 
participants. Following the WTP calculation, management scenarios where different levels of 
EG&S would be provided, were simulated. These results are expected and in agreement with the 
literature. Overall, the results from the interaction of the survey data with the model were 
satisfactory. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The economic integration between natural and managed ecosystem is a growing area of 
interest to agricultural policy makers. The literature explored in Chapter 2 highlighted some of 
the EG&S provided by wetlands; the problems related to properly defining property rights, and; 
some of the valuation tools and methods available to help policy development. The development 
of effective policy to ensure efficient provision of EG&S is hampered by a poor understanding of 
the preferences and values of EG&S held by farmers and society. Specifically in the province of 
Saskatchewan, it appears that little information is available to help policy makers ensure 
wetlands are conserved within privately-owned farmland. Economic valuation plays a role in 
assisting wetland management and informing policy development through the process of 
estimating the value to society. It acts to capture the economic values of benefits wetlands 
provide and to support the wise use of wetland resources. 
A choice model is a tool that can be used to provide important valuation information for 
EG&S provided by wetlands located in privately owned agricultural land. This information is 
important for designing effective economic incentive policy. The choice model assumes an 
underlying rational decision process and that this process has a functional form. Depending on 
the behavioural context, a specific functional form may be selected as a candidate to model that 
behaviour. This study considered the logit distribution in two different models as an 
approximation of the human behaviour towards utility maximization, which is consistent with 
the random utility theory (RUT). The models considered were the conditional logit model and 
the random parameter logit model. These models are used to understand the difference in utility 
when choices are made, and it assumes that people will choose the option that provides then 
greater utility. The main difference between these models is the underlying assumptions of the 
preferences. The conditional logit model would not allow error terms from one alternative to be 
correlated with error terms from other alternative. This assumption is a result from the 
specification of the model which provides the model with a nicely closed form. However, it is 
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possible that in some situations the assumptions from the condition logit may not be best 
suitable. Thus, a more flexible model was considered, the RPL. The RPL allows errors to be 
correlated by considering parameters as random. With this model, it was possible to satisfactorily 
estimate  participants’  willingness  to  pay  for  EG&S attributes associated with wetlands  in 
Saskatchewan. 
A web-based survey was delivered to a sample of Saskatchewan residents. The survey was 
mainly composed by three sections, the choice set, the level of responsibility measures, and 
demographic information. The EG&S related attributes found to be most relevant for participants 
when considering wetlands were riparian area, wildlife population, water quality, and payment. 
The survey was answered by 250 participants, aged 18 years or older, sampled from the list of 
Saskatchewan residents. 
As indicated by the results, respondents felt that all of the wetland EG&S are significant 
factors in the choice of a wetland management scenario. In other worlds, results suggest that 
Saskatchewan residents care about the EG&S provided through wetland conservation. In 
addition, higher levels of any single attribute increases the probability that a management 
scenario is selected, ceteris paribus.  Respondents prefer those wetland management scenarios 
which result in higher levels of riparian area, wildlife population and water quality. Water quality 
was the attribute that had the greater concern. People were willing to pay higher amounts for 
increasing the water quality. Indeed, the results from management scenarios presented in this 
study suggest that when considered wetland preservation in Saskatchewan agricultural areas, 
participants would most likely prefer policies that provide water quality. This is an important 
finding that has direct effect in policy development.  
It also important to consider that the majority of participants preferred a sharing cost 
structure where landowners and society would equally split the costs of conserving wetland. This 
finding also has direct implication for policy development. According to the methodology 
applied in the circumstances considered in this study, it is possible to conclude that a wetland 
policy in Saskatchewan would be more suitable for society if a cost structure in which society 
bear most part of the cost up to 50-50 is employed. Overall, this study is expected to help inform 
policy makers by quantifying the value of some  of  the  society’s preferences towards EG&S 
provision in Saskatchewan. 
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6.1.Final  considerations 
 
Despite its complexity in design and data analysis, CM has demonstrated its advantage of 
providing rich data set. By using CM, one can derive not only WTP for one overall change 
program but also WTP for each wetland attribute and multiple other overall change strategies. 
This helps wetland managers to prioritise the use of available resources for wetland management. 
Also, CM enables the inclusion of not only wetland biophysical attributes but also conservation 
program's socioeconomic impacts on local households. Therefore, the value estimates derived 
from CM are more helpful to decision makers because the values are derived in the context of 
the trade-off between environmental protection and development. 
However, the present study also presented some limitations. Even though the sample was 
compared to Census of Agriculture data and was shown to be broadly representative of 
Saskatchewan’s  society,  examination  of  surveys  from  two  hundred and fifty respondents might 
not be complete enough to make implication about all society. Likewise, considerable 
heterogeneity may occur if agricultural regions are compared. Studies could be conducted over 
different landscapes to capture the impact of various biological characteristics such as climate, 
soil productivity and precipitation and economic behaviour. Although CM can be applied in 
Saskatchewan context to estimate nonmarket values of wetland, further research on issues such 
as questionnaire design and survey method is needed. 
Indeed, there are many opportunities for future research of policies for EG&S preferences . 
The initial attempt this study made for valuing the cost-share for incentive payment needs more 
research. Wetland quality determines the function and variety of ecological services provided 
and therefore requires equivalent attention when wetland conservation policies are established. 
Three wetland attribute were considered, however; wetlands provides a complex vast amount of 
EG&S, which might be considered for a more comprehensive set of information when 
developing conservation policies. Further, understanding the relationship between wetland 
quality and its functions would assist decision makers to better target wetlands that yield greater 
environment benefits with fixed budget. Lastly, wetland valuation research should be 
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investigated from all sides of the wetland market. Currently, the majority of economic research 
has  focused  on  quantifying  society’s  valuation  of  the  goods  and  services wetlands provide from 
the  demand  side  of  the  market  using  valuation  study  to  estimate  society’s  WTP.  However, 
valuation from the supply side may be much more important due to its decisive role in wetland 
quantity and quality management and thus, there should be more work to develop it, such as 
some resent studies developed in Australia (e.g. Stoneham et al., 2003 ). 
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Unive rs ity of Saskatchewan 
 
Research Supe rvisor: Dr. Kenneth Belcher  (306)966-4019, ken.belcher@usask.ca, 
Department of Bioresource Policy, Business and Economics 51 Campus Drive , Saskatoon, SK, 
S7N 5A8 
Student Researche r: Mr. Vitor Dias (306) 966-4039 vitor.dias@usask.ca, Department of 
Bioresource Policy, Business and Economics 51 Campus Drive, Saskatoon, SK, S7N 5A8  
 
You are invited to participate in a research project entitled Values of Ecological Goods and 
Services for Policy development in Saskatchewan. Please read this form carefully, and feel free 
to ask questions that you might have.   
       
Purpose  and Procedure :  From a government policy perspective, the purpose of this 
study is to estimate the value of Ecological Goods and Services on an agricultural landscape of 
this province, to the people of Saskatchewan. We are asking that participants act as truthfully as 
possible in a survey where the demand of Ecological Goods and Services is targeted. The 
estimated time to complete the experiment is 10-15 minutes. 
Potential Bene fits : Your participation will increase the understanding around the priorities 
of Ecological Goods and Service provision policy for the province of Saskatchewan.  
Potential R isks :  There are no known risks associated with participating in the survey. All 
data will be stored in a safe and secure manner and all information will be confidential.   
Storage  of Data: The researcher will store all data collected in a safe and secure manner at 
the Department of Bioresource Policy, Business and Economics for a period of five years.  The 
data will be destroyed, after 5 years, when it is no longer required. 
Confidentiality:  The research conclusions will be published in a variety of formats, both 
print and electronic. The survey process does not enable a link between respondent identity and 
responses.  These materials may be further used for purposes of conference presentations, or 
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publication in academic journals, books or popular press. In these publications, the data will be 
reported in a manner that protects confidentiality and the anonymity of participants. The 
information provided by survey participants will be used and presented in aggregate without 
individual responses being reported.  
Right to Withdraw: Your participation is voluntary, and you can answer only those 
questions that you are comfortable with. The information that is shared will be held in strict 
confidence and discussed only with the research team. You may withdraw from the research 
project for any reason, at any time during the survey answering process, without penalty of any 
sort. If you withdraw from the research project, any data that you have contributed will be 
destroyed at your request. However, after the survey is completed, you may not be able to 
withdraw due to the inability of identifying your survey.  
Questions :  If you have any questions concerning the research project, please feel free to 
ask at any point; you are also free to contact the researchers at the numbers provided if you have 
other questions.  This research project has been approved on ethical grounds by the University of 
Saskatchewan Behavioural Research Ethics Board on (date:                                ).  Any questions 
regarding your rights as a participant may be addressed through the Ethics Office (966-2084).  
Out of town participants may call collect. 
Consent to Participate :   
I have read and understood the description provided; I have had an opportunity to ask 
questions and my/our questions have been answered. I consent to participate in the research 
project, understanding that I may withdraw my consent at any time. A copy of this Consent Form 
has been given to me for my records. 
 
I agree 
I do not agree  
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Appendix B 
 
 
 
Choice  Expe riment Survey Instrument 
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Choice  Expe riment Survey 
 
Department of B ioresource  Policy, Bus iness and Economics  
 
 
VALUES  OF ECOLOGICAL  GOODS AND SERVICES FOR POLICY 
DEVELOPMENT  IN SASKATCHEWAN 
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This survey has been developed to help determine the importance of Ecological Goods and 
Services (EG&S) in the agricultural regions of Saskatchewan. EG&S are the benefits arising 
from healthy ecosystems. These benefits accrue to all living organisms, including animals and 
plants, as well as humans. Examples of Ecological Goods: clean air and abundant fresh water; 
examples of ecological services: purification of air and water, and maintenance of biodiversity 
and habitat for wildlife.  
This survey is focused on some of the EG&Ss provided by wetlands and the vegetated 
riparian areas around the wetlands on agricultural land. In Saskatchewan, wetlands historically 
covered up to 23% of the land area, but it is estimate that 50-70% of these wetlands have been 
lost or altered, primarily due to agricultural drainage and cultivation. However, the adoption of 
environmentally friendly management practices by farmers can help maintain or even increase 
the EG&S provided. For example, polices that give incentives to farmers to revegetate riparian 
areas (those areas beside wetlands, streams and rivers) can promote increases in wildlife 
populations and water quality improvement. 
The purpose of this research is to value some of the EG&S that wetlands may provide to 
society. Thus, the information collected from this survey can be used to better manage some of 
Saskatchewan’s  natural  resources.   
 
 
 
You will be presented with different EG&S scenarios and will be asked to choose ONLY 
one option (A, B or C).  It is important that you   the option that is most acceptable to you. 
However, before choosing alternatives, it is important to understand what they represent. 
Consider:  
 
 Riparian Area: are those areas located immediately beside wetlands, streams and rivers. 
The riparian area can be measured according to the closest distance from the water 
surface to the agricultural land.  Science has shown that wider riparian areas can provide 
greater levels of EG&S such as filtration of soil sediment, pesticides and nutrients from 
runoff water and wildlife habitat.  Consider the diagram below, which show wetland 
areas within a cultivated field, as examples of different levels of riparian area. 
Values of Ecological Goods and Se rvices for Policy Deve lopment in Saskatchewan 
The  first section of the  survey focuses on your attitudes and values conce rning the  
E G &S provis ion 
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 0 metre riparian zone - Agricultural practices (e.g. cultivation, grazing) on 
agricultural fields go right to the wetland edge resulting in soil erosion and release of 
pesticides and nutrients directly into the water. 
 5 metre riparian zone - vegetated riparian zone: Will provide very limited buffering 
of sediment, pesticides and nutrients, will provide very limited additional wildlife 
habitat.   
 10 metre riparian zone - vegetated riparian zone: Establishment of perennial grasses 
in riparian zone to act as a buffer zone to decrease erosion and increase water quality, 
as well as providing some wildlife habitat.  
 20 metre riparian zone - vegetated riparian zone: In most cases provides very 
significant decreases in sediment, nutrient and pesticide entering the wetland and the 
riparian zone also provides habitat for wildlife. 
 
 
 Wildlife  Population: wetlands are an essential part of the life cycle of many wildlife 
species found in the agricultural zone of Saskatchewan.  
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  No act ion - with no specific conservation action, the wildlife habitat may continue to 
be converted to agricultural production and wildlife populations that depend of prairie 
wetlands may decrease.  
 Maintenance - low level of preservation actions would maintain the currently level of 
wildlife population. 
 High - high level of preservation actions would increase the currently level of wildlife 
population by 10%. 
 
 Wate r Quality: A Boil Water Advisory is a public warning stating that the water 
supplied by a specific location may be unsafe for consumption. This means that prior to 
drinking, cooking, or even brushing your teeth, the water must be brought to a rolling boil 
for a specified amount of time. These advisories are sometimes referred to as 
Precautionary Drinking Water Advisories. The more serious boil water orders are issued 
in the event of a water sample testing positive for biological, physical, or chemical 
contaminants. Examples would be if the coliform count exceeds provincial standards, or 
if the turbidity levels are too high. These orders are issued when there is a confirmed 
problem with the water that could pose as a health concern to those consuming it.  
Regional Health Authorities and the Saskatchewan Ministry of Environment have 244 
boil-water advisories (as of March 18th, 2010) – 183 were precautionary and 61 were 
emergency boil water orders. 
 
 No change – current pattern of boil water advisories continue with no anticipated 
decline and a potential for an increase in boil water advisories in future years.  
 Improve 10%:- Land and water management actions targeting an increase in water 
quality as demonstrated by a decrease in boil-water advisories by 10%. 
 Improve 40%: Land and water management actions targeting an increase in water 
quality as demonstrated by a decrease in boil-water advisories by 40%. 
 
 Price- Consider that you will be required to provide a one-time payment to help pay for a 
conservation program. The payment can range from $0 (when there is absolutely no 
conservation action) to $500 (when some kind of more significant action or change will 
be implemented). 
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As  you  prepare  to answer the next  few questions, please keep in mind that  in previous 
surveys  suggest  that  the  amounts  that  people  SAY  they  are  willing  to  pay  are  sometimes 
different  from the amounts that they would ACTUALLY be willing to pay when conservation 
options became available  in their community. For this reason, please  imagine your household 
is ACTUALLY paying the amount you choose. 
 
Scenar io 1: Suppose options A , B and C are the O NLY ones avai lable  
The following factors will vary 
under different management options 
OPTIO N A OPTIO N B OPTIO N C 
 
Ripar ian Buffer  
10 metre 20 metre 0 metre 
 
Wildl i fe 
Population 
High High No action 
 
Water Qual i ty 
No change Improve 40%  No change 
 
Pr ice 
 
$250.00 
 
$500.00 
 
$0.00 
Indicate which of the above options (A, B or C) would you prefer to have in the province of Saskatchewan 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY 
                                                               Option A                  
                                                               Option B 
                                                               Option C                                                    
 
 
Scenar io 2: Suppose options A , B and C are the O NLY ones avai lable  
The following factors will vary under 
different management options 
OPTIO N A OPTIO N B OPTIO N C 
 
Ripar ian Buffer  
5 metre 20 metre 0 metre 
 No action High No action 
- Choice  Se t - 
Please , cons ide r the  scenarios be low 
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Wildl i fe 
Population 
 
Water Qual i ty 
No change Improve 10%  No change 
 
Pr ice 
$50.00 $100.00 $0.00 
Indicate which of the above options (A, B or C) would you prefer to have in the province of Saskatchewan: 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY 
                                                               Option A                  
                                                               Option B 
                                                               Option C                                                    
 
Scenar io 3: Suppose options A , B and C are the O NLY ones avai lable  
The following factors will vary under 
different management options 
OPTIO N A OPTIO N B OPTIO N C 
 
Ripar ian Buffer  
10 metre 20 metre 0 metre 
 
Wildl i fe 
Population 
Low High No action 
 
Water Qual i ty 
Improve 40%  Improve 10%  No change 
 
Pr ice 
$10.00 $50.00 $0.00 
Indicate which of the above options (A, B or C) would you prefer to have in the province of Saskatchewan: 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY 
                                                               Option A                  
                                                               Option B 
                                                               Option C                                                    
 
Scenar io 4: Suppose options A , B and C are the O NLY ones avai lable  
The following factors will vary under 
different management options 
OPTIO N A OPTIO N B OPTIO N C 
 20 metre 5 metre 0 metre 
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Ripar ian Buffer  
 
Wildl i fe 
Population 
Low No action No action 
 
Water Qual i ty 
No Change Improve 40%  No change 
 
Pr ice 
$5.00 $100.00 $0.00 
Indicate which of the above options (A, B or C) would you prefer to have in the province of Saskatchewan: 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY 
                                                               Option A                  
                                                               Option B 
                                                               Option C                                                    
 
Scenar io 5: Suppose options A , B and C are the O NLY ones avai lable  
The following factors will vary under 
different management options 
OPTIO N A OPTIO N B OPTIO N C 
 
Ripar ian Buffer  
10 metre 5 metre 0 metre 
 
Wildl i fe 
Population 
No action Low No action 
 
Water Qual i ty 
No Change Improve 10%  No change 
 
Pr ice 
$500.00 $250.00 $0.00 
Indicate which of the above options (A, B or C) would you prefer to have in the province of Saskatchewan: 
 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY 
                                                               Option A                  
                                                               Option B 
                                                               Option C                                                    
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Scenar io 6: Suppose options A , B and C are the O NLY ones avai lable  
The following factors will vary under 
different management options 
OPTIO N A OPTIO N B OPTIO N C 
 
Ripar ian Buffer  
20 metre 10 metre 0 metre 
 
Wildl i fe 
Population 
Low No action No action 
 
Water Qual i ty 
No change Improve 10%  No change 
 
Pr ice 
$100.00 $250.00 $0.00 
Indicate which of the above options (A, B or C) would you prefer to have in the province of Saskatchewan: 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY 
                                                               Option A                  
                                                               Option B 
                                                               Option C                                                    
 
Scenar io 7: Suppose options A , B and C are the O NLY ones avai lable  
The following factors will vary under 
different management options 
OPTIO N A OPTIO N B OPTIO N C 
 
Ripar ian Buffer  
5 metre 10 metre 0 metre 
 
Wildl i fe 
Population 
Low No action No action 
 
Water Qual i ty 
No change Improve 10%  No change 
 
Pr ice 
$10.00 $50.00 $0.00 
Indicate which of the above options (A, B or C) would you prefer to have in the province of Saskatchewan: 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY 
                                                               Option A                  
                                                               Option B 
                                                               Option C                                                    
114 
 
Scenar io 8: Suppose options A , B and C are the O NLY ones avai lable  
The following factors will vary under 
different management options 
OPTIO N A OPTIO N B OPTIO N C 
 
Ripar ian Buffer  
20 metre 5 metre 0 metre 
 
Wildl i fe 
Population 
No action High  No action 
 
Water Qual i ty 
Improve 40%  Improve 10%  No change 
 
Pr ice 
$250.00 $500.00 $0.00 
Indicate which of the above options (A, B or C) would you prefer to have in the province of Saskatchewan: 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY 
                                                               Option A                  
                                                               Option B 
                                                               Option C                                                    
 
Scenar io 9: Suppose options A , B and C are the O NLY ones avai lable  
The following factors will vary under 
different management options 
OPTIO N A OPTIO N B OPTIO N C 
 
Ripar ian Buffer  
20 metre 5 metre 0 metre 
 
Wildl i fe 
Population 
No action High No action 
 
Water Qual i ty 
Improve 10%  Improve 40%  No change 
 
Pr ice 
$10.00 $5.00 $0.00 
Indicate which of the above options (A, B or C) would you prefer to have in the province of Saskatchewan: 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY 
                                                               Option A                  
                                                               Option B 
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                                                               Option C                                                    
 
 
 
 
 
1. How sure are you of the choices you made above? Please circle one number from 1 to 10, 
with  1 indicating  “very  unsure”  and 10 indicating  “very  sure”. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
very unsure                                                                                            very sure 
 
If you are unsure, please indicate why. 
 
    
 
2. Please rate these statements based on the extent to which they reflect your attitudes 
toward conserving natural areas. 
 
Str
ongly 
D isagree 
D i
sagree  
A
gree  
Str
ongly 
Agree  
No 
Opinion 
a) Landowners have moral obligation to 
preserve wetlands on their land 1 2 3 4 N 
b) Society has the moral obligation to 
help landowners to preserve wetlands on 
their land 
1 2 3 4 N 
c) Government should allocate more 
money from their budget to improve 
natural areas and environmental quality 
1 2 3 4 N 
d) Public policy cannot help 
environmental improvement 1 2 3 4 N 
 
 
  
3.  Suppose it is found that it will cost a landowner $100 per acre to preserve a 3 acre 
wetland on their land.  When preserved this wetland can provide the full range of EG&S 
provided by any healthy wetland.  What proportion of that $100 should the landowner be 
This second section is conce rned about some  of your responses and thoughts during 
the  last section 
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responsible for?  Choose a proportion from the following 100 point scale where 100 
indicates the landowner should be responsible for all wetland preservation costs while 0 
indicates that society, through public conservation payments, would fully compensate the 
landowner for wetland preservation costs.: 
 
  
 
4. On average, how often do you participate in nature-related activities in Saskatchewan? 
Please circle the number(s) that apply 
In Rural areas In Non-rural areas (e.g. urban parks) 
1. Never 
2. Less than once a month 
3. One to three times a month 
4. Once a week or more 
1. Never 
2. Less than once a month 
3. One to three times a month 
4. Once a week or more 
 
 
 
 
5. Gender:     Female    Male 
 
 
6. How old are you?  
 
Answer: ______ years 
 
 
7. Nationality:   Canadian    Other:___________________ 
 
 
8. Where is your home?    
 Rural, farm 
     Town (less than 5000 people) 
 Urban (5000 people or more) 
We  would like  to ask a few questions about your household. These  questions are  necessary 
to he lp us unde rstand how people  fee l about these  issues  
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9. Please indicate the highest level of education you have completed 
Circle one number 
1. Elementary school (grades 1 to 8) 
2. High school (grades 9 to 12) 
3. Trade school or technical college 
4. University 
5. Graduate degree 
 
 
10. What was your total annual household income last year, before taxes? 
Please circle one number 
1. $0 - $10,000 2. $10,001 - $20,000 3. $20,001 - $30,000 
4. $30,001 - $40,000 5. $40,001 - $50,000 6. $50,001 - $60,000 
7. $60,001 - $70,000 8. $70,001 - $80,000 9. $80,001 - $90,000 
10. $90,001 - $100,000 11. Over $100,000  
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If you have any other comments or concerns about this survey, please feel free to write 
them in the space below. 
 
______________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS SURVEY. 
 
  
If you have  any questions about this survey please  contact Vitor D ias at (306) 
9664039 or vitor.dias@usask .ca 
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Appendix C 
 
 
 
Test of Independence  from Irre levant Alte rnative  
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Test of IIA 
To decide if the IIA property is satisfied in an application, it is necessary to implement a 
test to establish violation of the condition. The standard test of IIA was proposed by Hausman 
and McFadden (1984), and is available in choice model statistic software (e.g. NLOGIT 8.0). 
This test is based on a comparison of the tested model and its restricted forms. According to 
Greene (2002), the test first estimates a model with all alternatives. The specification under the 
alternative hypothesis of IIA violation is the model with a smaller set of choices, estimated with 
a restricted set of alternatives and the same attributes. The set of observations is reduced to those 
in which one of the smaller sets of choice was made. The test statistic is (Greene, 2002): 
 
        (C.1) 
 
Where  ‘u’ and  ‘r’ indicate unrestricted and restricted (smaller choice set) models and V is 
an estimated variance matrix for the estimates.  
There is a possibility that restricting the choice set can lead to a singularity. When you drop 
one or more alternatives, some attribute may be constant among the remaining choices (Greene, 
2002).  Thus,  you  might  induce  the  case  in  which  there  is  a  ‘regressor’  which  is  constant  across 
the choices. In this case a singular Hessian will result. Hausman and McFadden (1984) suggest 
estimating the model with the smaller number of choice sets and a smaller number of attributes. 
There is no question of consistency, or omission of a relevant attribute, since the attribute is 
always constant among the choices, variation in it is obviously not affecting the choice. After 
estimation, the subvector of the larger parameter vector in the first model can be measured 
against the parameter vector from the second model using the Hausman statistic (equation C.1). 
This possibility arises in the model with alternative specific constants, so it is a common case 
(Greene, 2002). The counterpoint to this advantage, of course, is that, when IIA fails, this test do 
not provide as much guidance on the correct specification to use instead of logit (Train, 2002).  
However, if IID assumption is violated, MNL estimates might be bias; therefore, trigging 
the use of nested logit, mixed logit (e.g. random parameter logit), and latent class models 
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detailed in Louviere et al. (2000), Layton (2000) or Revelt and Train (1998), and Boxall and 
Adamowicz (2002), respectively. To introduce respondent heterogeneity, socioeconomic 
variables are used as independent variables in explaining the probability of choice (Do and 
Bennett, 2007). These models have been widely applied in estimating wetland values (Do & 
Bennett, 2007; Whitten & Bennett, 2005; Birol, Karousakis, & Koundouri, 2006). 
 
 
